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EXAMINATION OF POLICY
BRUCE R. WILDEt
About twenty years ago, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (Commission or FCC) first considered the issue of racial minor-
ity group participation in the broadcasting industry. This issue arose
following complaints that some broadcasters practiced discrimina-
tion in hiring.' The Commission, recognizing "a national policy
against discrimination in employment on the basis of race, religion,
sex, or nationality," 2 concluded that its statutory mandate of regulat-
ing broadcasting in the public interest' required taking action to
ensure equal opportunity in the industry. In a rulemaking, the com-
missioners declared: "we simply do not see how the Commission
could make the public interest finding as to a broadcast applicant
who is deliberately pursuing or preparing to pursue a policy of dis-
crimination--of violating the National policy." 4 Accordingly, the
Commission announced that it would entertain complaints of dis-
crimination against broadcasters and would take action if a "substan-
tial issue of discrimination" was raised.5 Later, the Commission
required broadcasters to adopt equal opportunity programs6 and to
file annual reports on their employment by racial categories. 7 It also
strongly suggested that broadcasters should take "affirmative action"
to increase minority employment.8
t B.A. 1973, Columbia University; J.D. Candidate 1990, University of
Pennsylvania. The author is a former radio and television news broadcaster, most
recently at WHBF-TV, Rock Island, Illinois, from 1978-87.
1 See Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show
Nondiscrimination in their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, 769 (1968).
2 Id. at 767.
3 See infra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
4 13 F.C.C.2d at 769.
5 Specifically, the Commission would refer complaints to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission or other appropriate state or local agencies for
investigation, or undertake its own investigation. On a finding of substantial
discrimination, the Commission would set the issue for hearing. Id. at 772.
6 See Nondiscrimination in Broadcast Employment, 18 F.C.C.2d 240, 243
(1969).
7 See Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show
Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices, 23 F.C.C.2d 430, 430 (1970).
8 See Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast
(979)
980 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:979
The Commision's equal opportunity stance was also supported
by a prior long-standing Commission policy which held that
increased diversity of viewpoints in broadcast programming is in the
public interest.9 Under that policy, the Commission has long
assumed that viewpoint diversity can be increased by promoting
diversity in the ownership of the means of mass communication.'
0
These two policy strands merged in a single policy favoring
minority ownership of broadcast stations. At court direction," the
Commission extended a limited preference in comparative licensing
proceedings to applicants demonstrating significant minority
involvement in their ownership and management structures.
2
In 1978, the Commission further developed this policy by creat-
ing economic incentives for current broadcast licensees to sell their
interests to minority-controlled business entities.1 3 One incentive,
Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d 226, 235 (1976) (adopting a sample equal opportunity/
affirmative action program); Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and
Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 54 F.C.C.2d 354 (1975) (proposing a sample
program).
The current FCC equal employment opportunity rules are found at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.2080 (1988).
9 See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394
n.4 (1965) (stating that "the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States
'rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public' " (quoting
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944))).
10 See id. at 394 (claiming that "[d]iversification of control is a public good in a
free society, and is additionally desirable where a government licensing system limits
access by the public to the use of radio and television facilities").
II See TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 986 (1974).
12 See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C.2d 979, 982 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Policy Statement].
The FCC conducts a comparative proceeding when two or more legally qualified
applicants seek the license to use a particular broadcast frequency and only one
license can be granted. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3591 (1988) (FCC will grant authorization
without hearing when there is no "mutually exclusive application" and other
requirements are met); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3593 (1988) (application will be designated
for hearing if requirements of § 3591 are not met, including situation of competing
qualified applicants). However, existing licensees in good standing are rarely
subjected to comparative hearings because the Commission affords a comparative
preference for substantial past public service. A competitor will be unable to
overcome this preference unless the incumbent's record is especially bad. See Central
Florida Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 506-10 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (approving
Commission policy of renewal expectancy), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983).
The minority preference afforded in comparative proceedings is discussed infra
at notes 33-37 and accompanying text. Details of the tax certificate program, which is
the subject of this Comment, are discussed infra at notes 38-72 and accompanying
text.
13 See 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 12, at 982-83.
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the distress sale policy, allows a licensee who faces a proceeding that
might result in forfeiture of a valuable license to avoid the threat of
total loss by transferring the licensed property to a minority entity at
a below market "distress" price.14 In addition, the Commission
announced that it would use its power to issue a certificate permit-
ting deferral of capital gains tax" in cases where a licensee sells to a
minority buyer. Provided the seller re-invests the proceeds within a
specified time in another company that holds a broadcast license (or
in other property considered "similar or related in service or
use"),1 6 the transaction will be treated as if it were an involuntary
conversion, and taxation of the gain is deferred as long as the
replacement property is held. 7 This specific program (program or
tax certificate program) is the subject of this Comment.
By October 18, 1988, the Commission had issued 166 such cer-
tificates for minority ownership.'" Indeed, use of the program
appears to have increased since 1986,19 when tax legislation elimi-
nated preferential treatment of capital gains income.20 As of 1986,
2.1% of all operating radio and TV stations in the United States
were minority-owned or controlled - a total of 209 radio stations
and 38 TV stations. 2 1 This percentage is far less than the fraction of
minority-group people in the United States, which is about 207.22
14 See Lebowitz, FCC Minority Distress Sale Policy: Public Interest v. the Public's Interest,
1981 Wis. L. REv. 365, 366 (discussing various aspects of minority distress sale
policy).
The distress sale policy was recently held to violate the fifth amendment due
process rights of a non-minority-controlled applicant which sought a license that the
Commission permitted to be assigned under the policy. See Shurberg Broadcasting
of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
15 The Commission is given this power by 26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1982). For the text
and an explanation of the statute, see infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
16 26 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (1982).
17 See 26 U.S.C. § 1033(a)(1) (1982) (governing tax treatment of involuntary
conversions of similar property); infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
The program has since been extended to cover sales of cable television facilities,
and tax certificates are available to investors who provide start-up financing for
minority broadcast enterprises when the investors subsequently sell their interest in
the minority business. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
18 See FCC Consumer Assistance and Small Business Division, Office of Public
Affairs, Minority Ownership Lists (updated Oct. 18, 1988) (front page) (on file with
University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
19 See id.
20 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 301, 311, 100 Stat. 2085,
2216-17, 2219 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
21 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, MINORITY BROADCASTING FACTS
6, 8 (1986).
22 In 1980, percentages of minority groups in the U.S. population were: Black,
11.7%; Spanish origin, 6.4%; Asian and Pacific Islanders, 1.5%; American Indian,
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Yet, it is a significant increase from 1978-the year the tax certificate
program started-when it was reported that less than 1% of com-
mercial broadcast stations were minority-controlled.23 The exact
amount of revenue the government loses because of the program has
not been publicly disclosed and may be unknown to the relevant
decisionmakers. The cost is probably about one hundred million
dollars a year.
24
Whether minority ownership of broadcasting stations is a worth-
while objective that government should encourage is a matter of
political and social policy that is beyond the scope of this Comment.
However, the tax certificate program does raise several questions
that are primarily legal, including the following:
1. Is conditioning the grant of a tax benefit based on the race of
the buyer of a broadcasting station a lawful exercise of the Commis-
sion's administrative discretion?
2. Is this type of racial classification by government consistent
with the equal protection and due process guarantees of the four-
teenth amendment?
3. Is the current structuring of the program as an element of the
income tax system an efficient and effective means of pursuing the
Commission's minority-ownership policy?
4. Assuming that the Commission's policy is to be pursued
through the tax system, is it being properly administered and con-
trolled from the standpoints of effectiveness, efficiency, and avoid-
ance of abuse?
These questions will be considered in turn. Statutory authority
is discussed in Part II, constitutionality is dealt with in Part III, tax
policy issues are addresed in Part IV, and Part V considers adminis-
trative problems with the existing program and how those problems
might be reduced. But first it is necessary to describe more fully the
development and functioning of the program as it now exists.
Eskimo, and Aleut, 0.6%; other nonwhite races, 3.0%. See 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, ch. B, pt. 1, at 1-12, -fig. 9.
23 See 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 12, at 981 (quoting FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S MINORITY OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE, MINORITY
OWNERSHIP REPORT (1978)).
24 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 10 1ST CONG., IST SESS., ESTIMATES
OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1990-1994, at 15 (Joint Comm.
Print 1989) (estimating revenue loss for all FCC tax certificates, including those for
minority ownership, at 100 million dollars a year for corporate tax returns and less
than 50 million dollars a year for individual returns).
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAx CERTIFICATE PROGRAM
A. The Public Interest in Minority Ownership
The Communications Act of 1934, as amended,2 5 gives the FCC
exclusive authority to determine who may operate a broadcasting
station within the United States.2 6 The Commission is directed to
grant applications for station licenses "if public convenience, inter-
est, or necessity will be served thereby."2 7 Once a license is granted,
the licensee may not assign it, nor may control of the licensed busi-
ness entity be transferred to any other person, unless application is
made to the Commission and it finds that the assignment or transfer
is in the public interest."8 The Commission also has specific statu-
tory authority to "[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe
such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of [the statute]." 2
The Supreme Court has held that "[t]his mandate to the FCC to
assure that broadcasters operate in the public interest is a broad one,
a power 'not niggardly but expansive.'-"o The Commission has
25 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982).
26 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307 (1982).
27 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982).
28 See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1982). Courts consistently have held that an FCC
license to operate a broadcast station is not personal property. See American
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ("'The policy of the
[Communications] Act is clear that no person is to have anything in the nature of a
property right as a result of the granting of a license.'" (quoting FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940))); 47 U.S.C. § 309(h) (1982) ("The
station license shall not vest in the licensee any right to operate the station nor any
right in the use of the frequencies designated in the license beyond the term thereof
nor in any other manner than authorized therein ....").
However, a licensee does have an effective power to assign her license or
transfer control of the licensed entity to any other person of her choosing who would
be eligible to receive the license. Section 310(d) provides, in part, that when a
licensee applies for permission to assign or transfer control, "the Commission may
not consider whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity might be served
by the transfer, assignment or disposal of the permit or license to a person other than
the proposed transferee or assignee." 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1982). This means that
"where permission is sought to assign a valid existing permit [or license], the only
question is whether the proposed assignee possesses the minimum qualifications
consistent with the 'public interest, convenience and necessity.'" MG-TV
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 408 F.2d 1257, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Because the licensee in good standing effectively can control disposition of the
license, she can demand as payment the capitalized value of the privilege of operating
the station in the future.
29 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1982).
3o Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969) (quoting
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943)).
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long taken the position that the public interest is advanced by diver-
sity of viewpoints expressed in broadcast programming, and it has
assumed that viewpoint diversity will be increased by increasing
diversity in ownership of the broadcast media.3 The courts generally
have accepted this interpretation of the public interest.32
Beginning in the 1970s, the idea of promoting the public inter-
est through ownership diversification was easily extended to encom-
pass the view that, other things being equal, the public interest
would be served by giving an advantage to members of racial minor-
ity groups in applying for station licenses. This new view was first
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In TV 9, Inc. v. FCC,33 the court concluded that the Commission,
under its existing comparative hearing criteria, should have given
extra merit to an applicant corporation in which two black persons
each owned approximately seven percent of the stock, and both were
to be directors with some limited involvement in station manage-
ment. The court said:
It is consistent with the primary objective of maximum diversifica-
tion of ownership of mass communications media for the Commis-
sion in a comparative license proceeding to afford favorable
consideration to an applicant who, not as a mere token, but in good
faith as broadening community representation, gives a local minor-
ity group media entrepreneurship.... We hold only that when
31 When more than one qualified applicant seeks the same broadcast license in a
comparative proceeding, the Commission awards merit to the applicant who has less
pre-existing ownership interests in other mass media, especially in the same market
area and region where the proposed station is to be located. See Policy Statement on
Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 393-95 (1965) [hereinafter 1965
Policy Statement]. The Commission also has long enforced limits on the number of
radio and TV station licenses one person may hold nationwide. The current limit is
12 licenses in each service (AM, FM, or TV), and no person may hold licenses for TV
stations serving more than 25% of the TV households nationwide. (However,
minority-group owners are allowed 14 stations per service and up to 30% of the
national TV market.) Also, no person may hold two licenses in the same service in
the same market area, nor may a radio station license be granted to a person who
already owns a TV station or daily newspaper in the market, nor may a TV station
license be granted to a person who already owns a radio station or daily newspaper in
the same market. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1988); Amendment of Section 73.3555 of
the Commission's Rules, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984) (latest amendment of the multiple
ownership rules).
32 See TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
986 (1974); Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.36
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
33 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
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minority ownership is likely to increase diversity of content, espe-
cially of opinion and viewpoint, merit should be awarded.3 4
On petition for rehearing, Judge Fahy, speaking for the court, made
clear that he was relying on both ownership and participation in man-
agement by minority persons, and he did not decide whether minor-
ity ownership alone would be entitled to merit. He added that he did
not envision an absolute preference for minority applicants, but only
that minority involvement should be given some weight in the over-
all comparative balancing formula.35 The TV 9 decision represented
a significant policy initiative by a court that normally gives substan-
tial deference to Commission policy choices. 36 But the Commission
adopted the court's policy as its own, and ever since, it has given
comparative merit to applicants who have substantial minority-group
ownership when the minority owners will be actively involved in day-
to-day station management.3 7 The requirement of "integration" of
34 Id. at 937-38.
35 See id. at 941.
36 See, e.g., Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 352 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) ("The FCC has broad discretion under section 307(b) [of the
Communications Act] to determine the public interest .... "); Syracuse Peace
Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("In making a public interest
judgment under the Communications Act, the Commission is exercising both its
Congressionally-delegated power and its expertise; it clearly enjoys broad deference
.... " (footnote omitted)); Health & Medicine Policy Research Group v. FCC, 807
F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[T]he Commission's judgment regarding how the
public interest is best served is entitled to substantial judicial deference." (quoting
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981))).
37 See 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 12, at 982 ("[The Commission's]
Administrative Law Judges have afforded comparative merit to applicants for
construction permits where minority owners were to participate in the operation of
the station. The Commission itself has ordered the expedited processing of several
applications filed by applicants with significant minority ownership interests."
(footnotes omitted)).
The merit given for minority-group ownership is considered to be an
"enhancement" of the principal comparative criterion of "integration of ownership
and management." Enhancement of the underlying percentage of ownership-
integration is also allowed for past or proposed local residence of integrated owners,
past participation in civic activities by integrated owners, and past broadcast
experience of integrated owners. See Formulation of Policies and Rules Relating to
Broadcast Renewal Applicants, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 5179, 5189 (1988).
Integration of ownership and management is one of six "significant factors" the
Commission has long considered in comparative licensing proceedings. Those
factors are (I) diversification of control of mass media, (2) participation in operation
by owners (integration of owners in management), (3) proposed programming
service, (4) past broadcasting record of applicant that is significantly above or below
average, (5) efficient use of the frequency, and (6) any significant deficiencies in an
applicant's character. See 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 31, at 394-99.
The 1973 policy development, placing merit for ownership by minority group
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ownership and management in order to obtain the minority prefer-
ence is an important one which, significantly, has not been carried
over into the tax certificate program.
B. Use of the Tax Certificate Authority
In 1978, the Commission declared that the previous measures
had not been sufficient:
[W]e are compelled to observe that the views of racial minorities
continue to be inadequately represented in the broadcast media.
This situation is detrimental not only to the minority audience but
to all of the viewing and listening public. Adequate representation
of minority viewpoints in programming serves not only the needs
and interests of the minority community but also enriches and edu-
cates the non-minority audience.
3 8
The 1978 Policy Statement reiterated the "diversity of ownership
equals diversity of viewpoints" premise and then announced that the
Commission would consider issuing tax certificates for sales of
broadcast facilities to "parties with a significant minority interest" in
cases where "there is a substantial likelihood that diversity of pro-
gramming will be increased."-
31
members within the broader factor of integration of ownership in management, may
explain why credit in comparative hearings is given only for minority-group owners
who will work in management. See New Continental Broadcasting Co., 88 F.C.C.2d
830, 844 (Rev. Bd. 1981) ("[T]he relevant consideration is not minority ownership
per se, but rather the extent to which minority owners are integrated into the
proposed station's operation." (citing WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12 (1978))).
38 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 12, at 980-81 (footnotes omitted).
One commentator suggests that in developing the tax certificate program, the
Commission was motivated not so much by a desire to further increase minority
participation in broadcasting, but rather to compensate, through a minority
ownership policy, for its own reduced commitment to equal employment opportunity
enforcement and the ascertainment process by which broadcasters had been obliged
to seek programming suggestions from community leaders, including those in
minority communities. See Honig, The FCC and Its Fluctuating Commitment to Minority
Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 27 How. LJ. 859, 864-73 (1984).
39 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 12, at 982-83. It should be noted that the
supposed advantages of diversity through minority ownership are not considered to
be dependent on the presence or absence of any particular racial and ethnic makeup
of the community being served, whether the context is a comparative license hearing
or an application for a tax certificate. See New Continental Broadcasting Co., 88
F.C.C.2d 830, 844-45 (Rev. Bd. 1981) (refusing to give applicant broadcast station
owned by combination of black and hispanic interests more minority ownership-
integration enhancement than a competitor wholly owned by hispanics, the Review
Board asserted that diversity "means exposing persons of one cultural stripe to the
possibly differing views of others with differing environmental backgrounds and
experiences").
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The 1978 Policy Statement represented a completely new applica-
tion of the tax certificate authority. Under section 1071 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code:
[i]f the sale or exchange of property (including stock in a corpora-
tion) is certified by the [FCC] to be necessary or appropriate to
effectuate a change in a policy of, or the adoption of a new policy
by, the Commission with respect to the ownership and control of
radio broadcasting stations, such sale or exchange shall, if the tax-
payer so elects, be treated as an involuntary conversion of such
property within the meaning of section 1033.40
Section 1033 provides that if the broadcast property is involuntarily
exchanged for other property "similar or related in service or use to
the property so converted, no gain shall be recognized."-41 If the
station is sold for money, the gain is recognized except to the extent
that the proceeds are re-invested in similar or related property
within two years of the close of the tax year in which the gain was
realized.42 Section 1071 provides that stock in a corporation that
operates a broadcasting station is automatically considered to be
similar or related property. A taxpayer who does not wish to invest
in related property can also avoid recognition by charging the gain
realized against basis in any other depreciable property remaining in
her hands after the sale or acquired within the same tax year.43
The language of section 1071 was first added to the Code as part
of the Revenue Act of 1943.44 The Commission was then trying to
eliminate common ownership of competing radio stations within the
same market. Congress intended to provide relief for licensees who
had to sell or exchange such stations as a condition of obtaining
license renewal.45 While there is no indication that Congress
40 26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1982); see also 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1071-1 to 1.1071-3 (1989)
(elaborating on the specific applications of 26 U.S.C. § 1071).
41 26 U.S.C. § 1033(a)(1) (1982); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.1033(a)-i (1988) (setting
forth general and special applications of § 1033 involuntary conversions).
42 See 26 U.S.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A)-(B) (1982). For a complete discussion of the
meaning of property "similar or related in service or use," other issues relating to tax
treatment of the certificate holder, and use of the tax certificate authority to
encourage breaking up grandfathered radio-TV and broadcast-newspaper cross-
ownerships, see Blake & McKenna, Section 1071: Deferral of Tax on FCC Sanctioned
Dispositions of Communications Properties, 36 TAX L. REV. 101 (1980).
43 See 26 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (1982).
44 Pub. L. No. 78-235, § 123(a), 58 Stat. 21, 44 (1944).
45 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1944), reprinted in
J. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAws,
1953-1939, at 1603 (1954); S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. 23, 53-54 (1943),
reprinted in J. SEIDMAN, supra, at 1602-03.
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intended the provision to be used for any other purpose, the lan-
guage is not specific, so the tax certificate authority may be just as
broad as the Commission's regulatory authority to make and change
policies concerning ownership and control of broadcasting sta-
tions.46 The Commission's power to use tax certificates to promote
minority ownership generallly has not been questioned.47
What has been disputed is how to define the amount and type of
minority involvement an assignee must have in order to make the
assignor eligible for a tax certificate. In its 1978 Policy Statement, the
Commission noted: "We currently contemplate issuing a certificate
where minority ownership is in excess of 50% or controlling.
Whether certificates would be granted in other cases will depend on
whether minority involvement is significant enough to justify the cer-
tificate in light of the purpose of the policy announced herein."
48
C. What is Minority-Owned or -Controlled?
For the first five years of the program, the Commission generally
required that minority-group members hold at least a 51% owner-
ship interest in the assignee.49 Forty-five percent ownership, where
46 The original version of the statute spoke of transactions "certified by the
[FCC] to be necessary or appropnate to effectuate the policies of the Commission
with respect to the ownership and control of radio broadcasting stations." See
Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235 § 123(a), 58 Stat. 21, 44 (1944). The
current language-"necessary or appropriate to effectuate a change in a policy of, or
the adoption of a new policy by, the Commission"-was substituted in 1958 to make
it clear that a tax certificate is available only when a station was lawfully acquired
under Commission rules and later disposed of in compliance with a new or changed
rule. See Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 48, 72 Stat.
1606, 1642 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1957).
Previously, the Commission had allowed certificates for the value of a whole
package transaction, even though an ownership policy was only advanced by
disposition of part of the package, when the seller showed that all the property
involved constituted a "single operational entity" and from a practical business
standpoint had to be sold as a unit. Apparently, the Commission decided this
treatment was excessively generous and, in 1982, announced that it would issue tax
certificates only for that property disposition which "directly effectuates" FCC policy.
See Policy Statement on Issuance of Tax Certificates, 92 F.C.C.2d 170, 171 (1982)
(emphasis in original).
47 However, the Commission itself once argued in a court brief that the tax
certificate program and other race- and gender- preference programs may be
unconstitutional. This position regarding the tax certificate program has never been
adopted by a court, and the Commission appears to have changed its collective mind.
See infra notes 73-148 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality and
lawfulness of the program).
48 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 12, at 983 n.20.
49 See Blake & McKenna, supra note 42, at 106-07 nn.23-24 (citing 1978 Policy
Statement, supra note 12, at 979, 983 n.20).
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the minority persons also had the right to vote an additional 10% of
the stock through a voting trust arrangement, was held to be insuffi-
cient.50 Similarly, the Commission denied a certificate where 30% of
the transferee corporation was owned by minority persons and three
of the seven directors were minorities, even though minority direc-
tors would comprise a majority of the "personnel committee" and
the "programming committee. '"51 The Commission concluded:
[The transferee] has failed to demonstrate that its minority princi-
pals will exercise permanent control over station operations. A
persuasive showing of permanent minority control is required so
that the Commission may avoid the intrusive and time-consuming
task of monitoring station programming and personnel decisions
in the future to insure compliance with the policy under which the
tax certificate was granted.5 2
The controlling share of ownership, however, need not be held by a
single minority person. It appears instead that any number of minor-
ity-group members may aggregate their shares to achieve "legal con-
trol." The apparent result of this is that a non-minority-group
person could be the largest single shareholder with up to 49% own-
ership, while a dozen minority-group persons shared 51% and the
entity would be considered minority-controlled.
In addition, "legal control" sometimes may be found short of
51% ownership. In 1978, the Commission granted a certificate
where the transferee was a limited partnership in which the sole gen-
eral partner was a minority person owning 11.4% of the equity and
total minority ownership equalled 45.5%.53 In 1982, the Commis-
sion established a general rule for limited partnerships: a tax certifi-
cate could be issued in transfers to limited partnerships if the general
partner or partners are minority persons and own more than 20% of
the partnership.5 4 The Commission added that "in order to avoid
'sham' arrangements, we will continue to review such arrangements
to ensure that complete managerial control over the station's opera-
tions is reposed in the minority general partner(s)."5 5
It is not always easy to determine if minority control of a busi-
50 See Long-Pride Broadcasting, 48 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1243, 1244 (1981).
51 See Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp., 71 F.C.G.2d 531, 532-33 (1979).
52 Id. at 534.
53 See William M. Barnard, 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 525, 526-27 (1978) (granting
certificate after concluding the minority general partner would have "exclusive
authority to manage and control the affairs of [the station]").
54 See Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in
Broadcasting, 92 F.G.C.2d 849, 855 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Policy Statement].
55 Id. at 855.
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ness is bona fide or is a "sham." Some indications of Commission
thinking can be gleaned from analogous cases involving requests for
comparative merit on the basis of integration of minority partners
into the management of an applicant. One partnership received
credit for integration of an hispanic partner who was to manage the
station even though his capital contribution was entirely financed by
the other non-minority partner.56 Similarly, another limited partner-
ship was granted credit for 100% integration of ownership in man-
agement where both general partners were minority-group
members, even though their cash contributions constituted less than
1% of the total equity investment.5 7 Where a minority general part-
ner has extensive experience in broadcast management and some of
the passive investors are also minorities, the Commission has indi-
cated that it will respect the claim of minority control, even if the
limited partners can remove the general partner for a "material
default" under the partnership agreement.58 Finally, in the case of a
corporate assignee, a tax certificate was issued where the minority-
group shareholder held only 21% of the shares, but had voting con-
trol because his class of shares carried more votes than the other
shares.59
56 The Commission concluded that the partnership agreement established the
bona fides of the arrangement by giving the minority partner "real authority,"
including negative control over major financial decisions. See Kist Corp., 102
F.C.C.2d 288, 291-92 (1985), aff'd mem., 801 F.2d 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
57 See Genesee Communications, Inc., 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 7252, 7256 (1987) (initial
decision of Administrative Law Judge). One-hundred percent of the ownership was
considered to be integrated because the general partners had complete managerial
control. Id. at 7254-55.
58 See Independent Masters, Ltd., 104 F.C.C.2d 178, 189, 192 (Rev. Bd. 1986).
The Commission concluded that the partnership agreement "provides some
reasonable assurance that [the general partner] cannot be summarily or arbitrarily
removed." Id. at 189.
59 The assignee corporation, WTVT Holdings, Inc., issued two classes of
shares. The 210 class A shares held by the minority-group shareholder carried four
votes each. The 790 class B shares held by the non-minority-group shareholder
carried one vote each. Thus, with just 21% of the total shares, the minority-group
shareholder controlled 51% of the votes. See Articles of Incorporation of WTVT
Holdings (March 4, 1987) (available in FCC license file of WTVT(TV)). On these
facts, a tax certificate was issued. See Certificate Issued by the Federal
Communications Commission Pursuant to Section 1071 of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. Section 1071) (April 27, 1987) (tax certificate issued to the
assignor, Gaylord Broadcasting Company) [hereinafter Tax Certificate].
In this case, the non-minority shareholder provided virtually all the financing for
the transaction. The corporation was capitalized at just $1,000, see Articles of
Incorporation of WTVT Holdings, supra, and the non-minority shareholder agreed
to arrange all financing for the purchase of WTVT. See Shareholder Agreement
among WTVT Holdings, Inc., Clarence V. McKee and GNG-3, Inc., 2 (April 7, 1987)
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Once a station has been assigned to a minority-controlled owner
and the assignee has been issued a tax certificate, the Commission
will not permit the license to be retransferred for one year except to
another minority owner,60 and it has declared an intention to "scru-
tinize routinely any subsequent application for transfer to guard
against possible abuses." 6 1 The Commission stated: "[T]he rapid
re-sale of such a station to a non-minority at a profit would subvert
our goal of increasing minority ownership of broadcast stations."' 62
D. Who Is a Minority Person?
In addition to the question of who has permanent legal control
of the buyer-assignee, there may be a question of whether such per-
sons qualify as "minority persons." In the 1982 Policy Statement, the
Commission said: "For purposes of this statement, the term 'minor-
ity' includes American Indians or Alaskan Natives, Asians and Pacific
Islanders, Blacks and Hispanics." 63  The Commission cited as
authority a prior amendment to the Communications Act in which
Congress had specified which minority groups were to receive "pref-
erence" in cases where the Commission used a random lottery pro-
cess to choose among qualified competing broadcast-license
applicants.'a The Conference report on the amending act6 5 states:
"It is the Conferees intention that the definitions in Office of Man-
[hereinafter WTVT Shareholder Agreement] (available in the FCC license file of
WTrVTCM).
The award of the WTVT tax certificate has been criticized and may not
accurately reflect current FCC policy; however, the criticism has not concerned the
equity structure of the transaction, but instead has centered on the lack of assurance
that the minority partner will remain involved in the station in the future. See infra
notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
60 This one-year holding rule had previously been imposed only on persons
who obtained a license through a comparative hearing. The Commission extended it
to cover assignees under a tax certificate or the distress sale policy. See Amendment
of Section 73.3597 of the Commission's Rules (Applications for Voluntary
Assignments or Transfer of Control), 99 F.C.C.2d 971, 972, 974 (1985) [hereinafter
Amendment of Section 73.3597].
61 William M. Barnard, 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 525, 527 (1978).
62 Amendment of Section 73.3597, supra note 60, at 974.
63 1982 Policy Statement, supra note 54, at 849 n. 1. This represents a change
from the Commission's 1978 Policy Statement which specified that "minorities
include those of Black, Hispanic Surnamed, American Eskimo, Aleut, American
Indian and Asiatic American extraction." 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 12, at
980 n.8.
64 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3) (1982) ("The term 'minority group' includes Blacks,
Hispanics, American Indians, Alaska Natives, Asians, and Pacific Islanders.").
65 Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96 Stat.
1087 (1982).
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agement and Budget Statistical Policy Directive No. 15, 'Race and
Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Report-
ing,' be utilized for guidance with regard to any dispute as to an indi-
vidual's membership in a named group."6 6 The OMB Directive
provides definitions of the various minority-group designations. 67 In
at least one case, the Commission has subsequently modified its defi-
nitions for purposes of determining eligibility for tax certificates to
conform with these OMB standards.6 8 It is reasonable to expect that
the Commission would rely on the definitions in the OMB Directive
to resolve any future questions about who is a qualified minority
buyer for purposes of the program.
E. Other Program Details
Since the adoption of the 1982 Policy Statement, sellers of broad-
cast stations have not been the only persons eligible to receive tax
66 H. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2261, 2289.
67 The Directive, which was formally issued by the Office of Management and
Budget in May, 1977, is reproduced and its development is explained in Wallman &
Hodgdon, Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting, 77-
10 STATISTICAL REP. 450 (1977). It provides the following definitions:
I. American Indian or Alaskan Native. A person having origins in any of the
original peoples of North America, and who maintains cultural
identification through tribal affiliation or community recognition.
2. Asian or Pacific Islander. A person having origins in any of the original
peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the
Pacific Islands. This area includes, for example, China, India, Japan,
Korea, the Philippine Islands, and Samoa.
3. Black. A person having origins in any of the black racial groups of
Africa.
4. Hispanic. A person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South
American or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.
5. White. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of
Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East.
Id. at 451.
68 See Storer Broadcasting, 87 F.C.C.2d 190 (1981). The Commission issued tax
certificates for assignment of licenses to Adolfo Liberman and his sons and to Oscar
Luis Kramer. Both presented evidence that they are Spanish-speaking and are
identified with the Hispanic communities in Florida. The Commission stated: "[W]e
conclude that the category 'Hispanic Surnamed' as used in the [1978] Policy Statement
includes those persons who are, in fact, Hispanic by origin or culture and
identification, but not necessarily 'Hispanic Surnamed.'" The Commission noted
that it had previously adopted the OMB standards in defining racial and ethnic
categories to be used by broadcast licensees in their required annual employment
reports. See also FCC Form 395-B, Broadcast Station Annual Employment Report
1988 (and instructions) (using OMB racial categories), reprinted in [Finding Aids,
Master Index, Forms] Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 98:395B-1, 98:395B-4 (1988).
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certificates. At the suggestion of its Advisory Committee on Alterna-
tive Financing for Minority Opportunities in Telecommunications,
the Commission also announced it would consider issuing tax certifi-
cates to persons who provide capital to help establish minority-con-
trolled broadcasting enterprises. To qualify, the investment must be
"start up" financing made before or within one year after the minor-
ity business receives a broadcast license. A certificate may be
granted to the investor at the time she subsequently sells her interest
in the minority business, deferring taxation of any capital gain real-
ized by the investor. The broadcast enterprise in which such an
investment was made must have been minority-controlled to begin
with and must continue to be minority-controlled after the sale of
equity by the investor who seeks a tax certificate.6" This expansion
of the program, like the original version, was justified by the Com-
mission's continuing goal of increasing programming diversity by
increasing the number of minority-controlled stations.
7 0
The types of property that may be sold to qualify for a tax certifi-
cate have been expanded beyond radio and TV stations. The Com-
mission decided, for example, that section 1071 could be extended
to reach cable TV systems and television networks.7 1 There have
been proposals to include cellular telephone systems as well, but the
Commission declined to take that step. 2
This, then, is an outline of the tax certificate program as the
Commission has developed and implemented it to date. But is it a
sound program? Is it legally proper, and is it well-designed? Exami-
nation of these issues begins with a consideration of statutory
authority and constitutionality.
II. STATUTORY AUTHORrr
The tax certificate program for minority ownership was created
by the Commission entirely on its own initiative, without direction
from Congress, using general statutory authority that had been
69 See 1982 Policy Statement, supra note 54, at 856-57 & n.39.
70 "The use of tax certificates as creative financing tools will facilitate
significantly minority entrepreneurs' access to necessary financing, thus effectuating
the important policy of promoting minority ownership .... " Id. at 857.
71 See Policy Statement on Minority Ownership of Cable Television Facilities, 52
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1469, 1472 (1982).
72 See Cellular Mobile Sys. of Tampa, 98 F.C.C.2d 231, 234-35 (1984) (declining
to grant any minority preference in cellular telephone licensing because a cellular
service is a common carrier, not a mass media service, and therefore the licensee has
no control over the content of radio communications, making the diversification
justification inapplicable).
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granted for entirely different purposes more than thirty years
before.7 In 1987, Congres; finally gave its blessing to the program,
not through direct authorization, but by forbidding the Commission
to eliminate or reconsider the existing program. Although the will of
Congress is no longer in doubt, Congress did not make its wishes
explicit until a federal appeals court decision and a change in philos-
ophy within the Commission itself placed the program in jeopardy.
74
The history of the program provides an interesting study of the
extensive policy-making power of an administrative agency operating
with the support of the courts, but also illustrates the vulnerability of
such policy initiatives.
A. Making the Policy
The key policy underlying the tax certificate program is that the
Commission should give members of racial minority groups special
advantages in obtaining control of broadcast licenses. The policy
favoring minority owners dates from 1973, when the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Commis-
sion's previous stand and announced in TV 9, Inc. v. FCC75 that
awarding "merit" to applicants for minority-group involvement in
ownership and management was not only permissible, but required
by statute. The Review Board, in an opinion accepted by the Com-
mission, had taken the view that "the 'Communications Act, like the
Constitution, is color blind. What the Communications Act
demands is service to the public in the programming of the station
and that factor alone must control the licensing processes, not the
race, color or creed of an applicant.' -76 The appeals court
responded:
To say that the Communications Act, like the Constitution, is color
blind, does not fully describe the breadth of the public interest cri-
terion embodied in the Act. Color blindness in the protection of
the rights of individuals under the laws does not foreclose consid-
eration of stock ownership by members of a Black minority where
the Commission is comparing the qualifications of applicants for
broadcasting rights .... 77
This stand was controversial in 1973. Fourjudges wanted to rehear
73 See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
74 See infra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
75 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
76 Id. at 936 (quoting Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17 (Rev.
Bd.), aft'd, 37 F.C.C.2d 559 (Commission 1972) (citation omitted)).
77 Id.
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the case en banc to consider whether the panel's interpretation of
the statute amounted to unconstitutional race discrimination. 78 The
decision, however, stood. The court's interpretation of the statute
has since been reaffirmed and clarified by the same court in West
Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,79 holding that the Commission
could give merit to a minority applicant regardless of whether or not
there was a substantial minority-group population in the city of
license. Increased media ownership by minority-group persons any-
where, the court decided, should conclusively be presumed to
advance the public interest.80
The Commission used the TV 9 interpretation of the Communi-
cations Act mandate and combined it with the general tax certificate
authority contained in section 1071 of the Internal Revenue Code'
to create another tool in the service of minority ownership policy-
the tax certificate program.8 2
B. .4 Hint of Congressional Policy
In 1982, after four years of the tax certificate program and two
years before West Michigan, Congress first signalled its approval of
the general policy of giving advantages to minority persons in gain-
ing control of broadcast licenses. Section 115 of the Communica-
tions Amendments Act of 198283 authorized the Commission to
78 See id. at 942 (statement of Wilkey, J.) ("I think this country and its courts
long ago reached the conclusion that race could not be a merit or demerit and that
any decision based on race as a factor was constitutionally wrong, morally wrong, and
dangerous.").
79 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985).
80 See id. at 608-12. In TV 9, the court noted that there was a substantial black
population in the Orlando, Florida area where the station was located and that none
of the other media in the area were black-owned. However, the West Michigan court
concluded that those factors were not necessary to the TV 9 result:
[G]iven the extreme underrepresentation of minorities in ownership of
the broadcast mass media, the rationale of promoting program diversity
- a rationale that is derived from the First Amendment and at the heart
of the Communications Act - supports granting positive weight to
minority ownership as a factor in comparative broadcast hearings where
that ownership is accompanied by participation in station affairs.
West Michigan, 735 F.2d at 610 (citation omitted); cf Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that where two daytime-only radio stations competed for
authority to operate at night, the fact that one station was black-owned should have
been considered).
81 26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1972).
82 See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
83 Pub. L. No. 97-259, § 115, 96 Stat. 1087, 1094-95 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(i) (1982)).
1990]
996 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:979
choose by lottery among competing qualified applicants for certain
licenses as an alternative to lengthy comparative proceedings. How-
ever, in using such a procedure, Congress required that:
significant preferences will be granted to applicants or groups of
applicants, the grant to which of the license or permit would
increase the diversification of ownership of the media of mass com-
munications. To further diversify the ownership of the media of
mass communications, an additional significant preference shall be
granted to any applicant controlled by a member or members of a
minority group.
8 4
The legislative history of this provision notes with approval the Com-
mission's continuing minority-group enhancement policy and diver-
sity of viewpoint rationale, and clearly shows that Congress wanted
to ensure that a similar minority preference was applied in any ran-
dom selection licensing sysitem.
8 5
C. The Policy Starts to Unravel
The combination of TV 9, West Michigan, and the 1982 legisla-
tion seemed to settle the question of statutory authority for the tax
certificate program. Then came Steele v. FCC.86 In Steele, the Com-
mission had chosen a female over a male applicant in a comparative
license proceeding, and the Review Board stated that the " '100%
female integration [of the winning applicant] is decisively impor-
tant.'"" The Commission thus expanded its minority-preference
policy to include women as well. In a split decision, the court of
appeals held that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority in
attempting to create a preference for female applicants. 8 8 The opin-
ion and judgment were later vacated, and the case was remanded to
the Commission at the Commission's request. 89 However, the rea-
soning employed in the original opinion raised substantial concerns
about statutory authority that may be more important in the tax cer-
tificate program than they were in the comparative enhancement
credit that was before the court.
84 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A) (1982).
85 H. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2261, 2284.
86 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
87 Id. at 1194 (court's emphasis) (quoting Review Board opinion below which
was affirmed by the Commission without comment).
88 Id. at 1199.
89 See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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In the opinion, Judge Tamm9° attacked the assumption that
diversity of ownership is likely to produce diversity of program con-
tent. He argued:
There is no reason to assume, for example, that an Italian station
owner would primarily program Italian operas or would eschew
Wagner in favor of Verdi. Similarly, it is questionable whether a
black station owner would program soul rather than classical music
or that he would manifest a distinctively "black" editorial view-
point. Indeed, to make such an assumption concerning an individ-
ual's tastes and viewpoints would seem to us mere indulgence in
the most simplistic kind of ethnic stereotyping.
91
He suggested an alternative assumption: that station owners are
most likely to respond to a profit motive and to design programming
they believe will appeal to their available audience, thus maximizing
ratings and advertising revenue.92 Judge Tamm found the Commis-
sion's assumption "so questionable as a matter of fact and so offen-
sive as a matter of principle" that it exceeded the agency's discretion
under the statute.93 He concluded: "a mandate to serve the public
interest is not a license to conduct experiments in social engineering
conceived seemingly by whim and rationalized by conclusory
dicta.",
94
UnderJudge Tamm's analysis, the race or sex of a station owner
should make no difference, and the public interest in programming
diversity should not justify a policy of favoring women or minority-
group members. 95 This analysis would lead us back to a color- and
gender-blind diversification policy of the sort the Commission used
for many years before TV 9.
The Steele opinion raised interesting questions, but it conflicted
with the established case law and the policy direction of the Commis-
sion up to 1985. It may therefore be viewed simply as an aberration.
Accordingly, it has been severely criticized.96 Nevertheless, the
90 Judge Tamm joined in one of the published statements questioning the TV 9
decision. See TV 9, 495 F.2d at 942.
91 Steele, 770 F.2d at 1198.
92 See id. at 1198-99.
93 Id. at 1199.
94 Id.
95 However, a policy of favoring non-media-owners over current media owners,
that is, ownership diversity without regard to group affiliation of individual
applicants, might still be justified. Id. at 1195.
96 See generally Comment, The Female Merit Policy in Steele v. FCC: "4 Whim
Leading to a Better World?" 37 AM. U.L. REV. 379, 396-415 (1988) (arguing that the
Steele decision and FCC brief on rehearing were incorrect).
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Commission seized upon it and requested a remand, committing
itself to reexamine not just female preference, but all its racial pref-
erence programs as well.97 The FCC issued a notice of inquiry that
requested public comments on the constitutionality and effectiveness
of the race and gender preference programs.98 The inquiry was cut
short, however, by Congressional intervention.
D. Congress Stops the Debate
When the instability of the Commission's independent policy
initiative became apparent, Congress was motivated to act. A
December 22, 1987 supplemental appropriation99 included a rider
prohibiting the Commission from changing or reexamining any of its
race or gender preference programs, including the tax certificate
97 Technically, the Court of Appeals first vacated the panel opinion en banc and
requested new briefs on the statutory authority and constitutionality of gender
preference. The Commission's brief questioned the legality of its own policy and
requested a remand to re-examine the programs. The court ordered the remand on
October 9, 1986. See Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing,
Distress Sales and Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender
Classifications, I F.C.C. Rcd. 1315, 1316 (Dec. 30, 1986) [hereinafter Re-
examination].
The Commission's actions were criticized as a significant retreat from its
previous support of affirmative action. See Minority-Owned Broadcast Stations: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1986) (statement of Rep. Collins)
("[T]his is an attempt on the pan of the current Commission to abolish the credit
given to minority and female applicants in comparative hearings. There is nothing
that I have seen or heard to date which could justify such a policy switch."); Brown
(former FCC Commissioner), The FCC's New Threat to Minority Preferences, Washington
Post, Sept. 26, 1986, at A-27, col. 4 ("The decision of the Federal Communications
Commission to repudiate its longstanding support for increased minority
involvement in broadcasting is at best an unwitting insult to the aspirations of
minority Americans. The Commission is trying to hide that fact under a cloak of
constitutional arguments.").
98 See Re-examination, supra note 97, at 1317-18. The Commission explained its
concerns as follows:
[T]he purpose behind each of these policies has been to expand program
diversity. We find program diversity [to be a] compelling governmental
interest within the Commission's authority. Although we do not interpret
the Supreme Court opinions to preclude consideration of race or gender
in the licensing process under all circumstances, we do read these cases to
mean that the use of minority/gender status must include a determination
of whether their use is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve their
goals .... To this end, we seek to determine whether there is a nexus
between minority/female ownership and viewpoint diversity, and whether
such ownership is necessary to achieve this goal.
Id. at 1317.
99 Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329.
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program.' 0 In obedience to this enactment, the Commission closed
its inquiry' 0 ' and reaffirmed its grant of the station license to the
female applicant in the Steele case."0 2 There have been no further
proceedings in the appeals court.
E. Conclusion
Congress has answered the statutory authority question by effec-
tively ratifying the Commission's interpretation of the public interest
standard and adopting a legal presumption that minority ownership
produces more diverse programming that better serves the public
interest.10 3 However, Judge Tamm's logical objections to the rea-
soning remain. The diversity presumption may be justified in the
context of comparative licensing, since the Commission requires
integration of the credited minority-group ownership into daily man-
agement. The tax certificate program is more problematic because
the minority owner can be an absentee owner or a diffused aggrega-
100 The provision states:
[N]one of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to repeal, to
retroactively apply changes in, or to continue a reexamination of, the
policies of the Federal Communications Commission with respect to
comparative licensing, distress sales and tax certificates granted under 26
U.S.C. 1071, to expand minority and women ownership of broadcasting
licenses, including those established in Statement of Policy on Minority
Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C. 2d 979 and 69 F.C.C. 2d
1591, as amended 52 R.R. 2d 1313 (1982) and Mid-Florida Television
Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d, 607 (Rev. Bd. 1978) which were effective prior to
September 12, 1986 ....
Id at 1329-31.
Similar language contained in a bill that was designed to codify broadcasters'
license renewal expectancies had been considered in committee earlier in the session.
See Broadcasting Improvements, 1987: Hearings on S. 1277 Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transp., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. II, § 402 (1987). The bill died after
facing broadcasters' resistance to the compromises incorporated in the license
renewal scheme. See Broadcasters Balk at Quid Pro Quo for Two-Step Renewal, BROADCAST-
ING, July 27, 1987, at 88 ("[B]roadcaster organizations for the most part were
opposed. There are many within the industry who feel the trade-offs in the bill are
too high.").
1o See Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress
Sales and Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender
Classifications, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 766 (1988).
102 See Cannon's Point Broadcasting Co., 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 864 (1988).
103 The District of Columbia Circuit recently concluded that the closely
analogous minority ownership distress sale policy, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text, was also within the Commission's statutory authority, since
Congress has indicated its approval of minority preferences in station licensing. See
Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 909-10 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
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tion of many owners, none of whom controls daily operations. Thus,
minority ownership may not change or diversify the programming
that the public receives, weakening the Commission's public interest
justification."t 4
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Although the tax certificate program is now firmly rooted in con-
gressionally-determined policy as a statutory matter, that does not
resolve the potential constitutional objections. To date, the constitu-
tionality of the program has never been adjudicated, but the
Supreme Court may provide an answer this year. On January 8,
1990, the Court granted certiorari in cases that squarely present the
constitutionality of both of the racial preference programs that are
companions of the Commission's tax certificate program. Metro
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC'0 5 is an appeal of a losing applicant in a com-
parative license proceeding in which the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit upheld giving merit to a rival minority-
controlled applicant. Astrotine Communications Co. L.P. v. Shurberg
Broadcasting of Hartford Inc. "06 is an appeal by a minority-controlled
assignee who purchased a television station at reduced price under
the distress sale policy only to have the transaction rejected by
another panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in a decision that held the distress sale program unconstitu-
tional. The rest of this Part considers the constitutionally important
features of the tax certificate program and the case law which, except
as noted, bear equally on both tax certificates and the companion
programs which have been presented to the Court for review.
The essence of the tax certificate program is that it awards or
denies tax deferral to the seller of a broadcasting station depending
on the race or ethnic identity of the assignee.10 7 The government
does not directly distribute benefits based on the race of recipients.
Instead, the FCC program has created an economic incentive to
104 This issue is reconsidered infra notes 195-200.
105 Winter Park Communications Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. granted sub noma. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 58 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 9,
1990) (No. 89-453).
106 Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. granted sub nom. Astroline Communications Co. L.P. v. Shurberg
Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1990) (No. 89-700).
107 The program also makes tax certificates available to investors providing
"start-up" financing for minority-owned stations. See 1982 Policy Statement, supra
note 54, at 855-58.
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encourage broadcast licensees to discriminate in favor of members
of certain racial and ethnic groups when the licensees negotiate to
sell broadcast properties. Conversely, the program denies the tax
benefit to licensees who choose to sell to entities that are not minor-
ity-owned. From the perspective of potential buyers of broadcast
stations, the program advantages minority purchasers. Sellers con-
cerned about capital gains tax will tend to seek minority-owned buy-
ers and discount the bids of non-minority-owned bidders.
The program clearly constitutes state action using racial classifi-
cations. That it operates indirectly through tax incentives rather
than directly as a spending program should not make a difference
constitutionally.1 0 8 If it did, the government could readily circum-
vent the due process guarantee of the fifth amendment 0 9 by creat-
ing economic incentives for private persons to carry out the racial
discrimination that the government itself is forbidden to practice.
The Constitution prohibits the government from using racial
classifications, even to benefit an historically disadvantaged group,
unless those classifications are necessary to protect compelling and
legitimate state interests. 10 What constitutes a compelling state
108 See Comment, Tax Incentives as State Action, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 414, 449
(1973) (arguing that tax provisions intended as social and economic incentives
should be analyzed to determine the applicability of constitutional restrictions on
state action); cf. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 459 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-
judge panel) (holding tax exemptions for fraternal organizations to be state action
invoking fifth amendment scrutiny).
109 Courts generally have assumed that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment imposes restrictions on actions of the federal government equivalent to
those that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment imposes upon
the states. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973) ("[W]hile the
Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination
that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.'" (quoting Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964))); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) ("In
view of our decision [in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)] that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools,
it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government.").
110 The Supreme Court's affirmative action cases emphasize this principle. See,
e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 727 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
opinion of the Court) ("[T]he city has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in
apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race."); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) ("We
must decide whether the layoff provision is supported by a compelling state purpose
and whether the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are narrowly tailored.");
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) ("A
program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial context, calls for
close examination .... ); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299
(1978) (Powell, J.) (holding that an individual harmed by racial classification is always
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interest, whether a particular racial classification is necessary to pro-
tect the interest, and whether a given program is sufficiently nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that goal, remain subject to considerable
dispute.
Constitutional limits on affirmative action remain uncertain
largely because the cases have severely splintered the Supreme
Court. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., decided in 1989, was the
first constitutional affirmative action case to produce any sort of
majority opinion."' Application of the affirmative action decisions
to the tax certificate program is particularly difficult because the pro-
gram has always been justified by the general public interest and first
amendment values, 12 while the decided cases have focused on past
racial discrimination as the underlying factor providing justification
for racial classifications."' Based on the Court's recent analytical
approaches, the tax certificate program probably Would not survive
constitutional scrutiny as it is currently presented- that is, as a pro-
gram designed and adopted by an administrative agency with a man-
date only to regulate communications in the public interest. At the
"entitled to ajudicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis
is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest"); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (Black, J.) ("[A]ll legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect .... [C]ourts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions .... ").
A majority of the court now is of the view that there is only one standard of
scrutiny for racial classification. It is strict, regardless of whether the classification
appears to advantage or disadvantage a racial minority group. See City of Richmond,
109 S. Ct. at 721 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ. and White and Kennedy,
JJ.) ("Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or
'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of
racial inferiority or simple racial politics."); id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) ("[S]trict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classification by
race .... ). This clear majority position is now acknowledged even by the Justices
who have long argued that a less strict standard should apply in affirmative action
cases. See id. at 752 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting)
("Today, for the first time, a majority of this Court has adopted strict scrutiny as its
standard of Equal Protection Clause review of race-conscious remedial measures.
This is an unwelcome development." (citation omitted)).
III City of Richmond was a six to three decision, but only five Justices joined in
Justice O'Connor's opinion, and that majority agreed on only part of her analysis. See
109 S. Ct. at 712.
112 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
113 See, e.g., City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 720 (noting that the city could take
affirmative action if it had participated in racial discrimination); Wygant, 476 U.S. at
274 (noting that a showing of governmental discrimination is needed to justify racial
classifications).
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same time, Congress would appear to have the power to remove the
constitutional cloud if it were to make appropriate findings of past
discrimination and to explicitly reenact the program based on those
findings.
A. Compelling State Interest
When the Commission adopted the tax certificate program, it
stated that its purpose was to advance the public interest in diversity
of broadcast programming and specifically to increase the expression
of minority viewpoints.14 It declared that "diversified programming
• . . is a key objective not only of the Communications Act of 1934
but also of the First Amendment." '  The Commission cited the
finding of its Minority Ownership Task Force that fewer than one
percent of the commercial radio and television stations then operat-
ing in the United States were minority-controlled, and it concluded:
"[T]he present lack of minority representation in the ownership of
broadcast properties is a concern to us. We believe that diversifica-
tion in the areas of programming and ownership-legitimate public
interest objectives of this Commission-can be more fully developed
through our encouragement of minority ownership of broadcast
properties."' 
1 6
Viewpoint diversity, indeed, is the only justification the Commis-
sion has ever offered for the racial classification employed in the tax
certificate program." 7 The Court probably would not find this to be
a compelling governmental interest. The Supreme Court's recent
affirmative action decisions have focused instead on remedies of spe-
cific past racial discrimination as the interest that can justify racial
classifications."' The concept is derived from the school desegrega-
tion cases in which the courts ordered race-conscious remedies after
114 See 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 12, at 981.
115 Id.
116 Id
117 The same basic rationale was recited in the 1982 Policy Statement which
broadened eligibility for tax certificates:
The Commission has traditionally considered the under-
representation of minority points of view over the airwaves as detrimental
to minorities and the general public. Accordingly, we have taken steps to
enhance the ownership and participation of minorities in the media, with
the intent of thereby increasing the diversity in the control of the media
and thus diversity in the selection of available programming, benefitting
the public and serving the principle of the First Amendment.
1982 Policy Statement, supra note 54, at 849-50 (footnotes omitted).
118 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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finding specifically that school authorities had practiced discrimina-
tion. 11" Two current Justices, Rehnquist and Scalia, appear to take
the view that only the remedying of past discrimination will justify a
racial classification.' 20 Only Justice Stevens specifically accepts the
idea that governmental interests other than remediation can justify
racial classifications.' 2 ' Justice Stevens dissented in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education 122 because he thought the school board could
"reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to pro-
vide benefits to the student body that could not be provided by an
all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty."2 He recognized a "rational
and unquestionably legitimatte basis" for a collective agreement that
would protect minority teachers with less seniority from the effects of
economic layoffs.' 24 The Court, however, ignored the educational
purpose argument and decided that the school board's action was
unconstitutional because the board did not have "convincing evi-
dence" that there had been prior employment discrimination requir-
ing remediation.'
25
An argument that the Commission's diversity interest indeed is
compelling might be derived from Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.
Although the Court condemned the University of California's special
medical school admission policy because it created a numerical quota
for minority-group students, 126 Justice Powell suggested that the
medical school might have a compelling interest in creating a diverse
119 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-31
(1971) (upholding a remedial order involving racial quotas for schools, re-drawing of
boundaries along racial lines, and busing for integration).
120 See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 737 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment) ("In my view there is only one circumstance in which the
States may act by race to 'undo the effects of past discrimination': where that is
necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial
discrimination."); Fullilove v. Klulznick, 448 U.S. 448, 528 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
joining in dissent of Stewart, J.) ("Certainly, nothing in the Constitution gives
Congress any greater authority to impose detriments on the basis of race than is
afforded the Judicial Branch. And ajudicial decree that imposes burdens on the basis
of race can be upheld only where its sole purpose is to eradicate the actual effects of
illegal race discrimination." (footnote omitted)).
121 See City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 730 n.I (Stevens,J., concurring in part and
in judgment) ("I think it unfortunate that the Court in neither Wygant nor this case
seems prepared to acknowledge that some race-based policy decisions may serve a
legitimate public purpose.").
122 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
123 Id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124 See id. at 315-16.
125 See id. at 277-78 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
126 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978)
(Powell, J., opinion of the Court).
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student body in order to foster intellectual give and take necessary to
the educational process.' 27 Therefore, the use of race as one factor
in a multifactor admissions policy aimed at creating diversity could
bejustified.t's In 1984, the District of Columbia Circuit used Justice
Powell's reasoning and analogized that there was a compelling state
interest in diversity of broadcast programming that would justify giv-
ing some credit to minority control of an applicant in a comparative
licensing case.1 29 However, even if the analogy is valid, there is
some doubt whetherJustice Powell's 1978 dicta would carry a major-
ity of the Court today.'3 ° It should also be noted that unlike compar-
ative merit, where race is but one of many factors weighing in a
decision, in the tax certificate and distress sale programs, race is the
sole factor that determines whether a governmental benefit is given or
withheld.
The public interest invoked by the FCC in support of the tax
certificate is also quite similar to the "role model" justification
offered in Wygant-a reasonable and arguably "compelling" goal that
is within the Commission's special area of competence to judge.1
3 '
The current Court, however, appears hostile to such justifications,1
3 2
and might not find the "diversification" interest sufficiently
compelling.
B. Narrowly Tailored
Different views of compelling state interests lead to different
standards for assessing the requirement that racial classifications be
narrowly tailored to furthering compelling interests. If one justifies
127 See id. at 311-13.
128 See id.
129 See West Mich. Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601, 614-15 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985).
130 See Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 919-21
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom. Astroline Communications Co. L.P. v. Shurberg
Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1990) (No. 89-700)
(questioning whether Powell's view in Bakke survives City of Richmond, and further
suggesting that the FCC itself has undermined the diversity justification by relying on
the market rather than regulation to protect the public's interest in diversity). But see
Comment, The Constitutionality of the FCC's Use of Race and Sex in the Granting of Broadcast
Licenses, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 665 (1989) (arguing that diversity is a compelling interest
and that comparative merit-which may be distinguishable from tax certificates-
remains constitutionally permissible).
131 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text; cf Wygant, 476 U.S. at 315
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt is quite obvious that a school board may reasonably
conclude ,that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student
body that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty.").
132 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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the classification as remediation of past racial discrimination, then
the remedy must be narrowly drawn to benefit the class that suffered
the discrimination. It must not extend any farther than the constitu-
tional violation that is being remedied, and it must not impose dis-
proportionate burdens on the members of the racial majority who
are disadvantaged. This standard implies that "a generalized asser-
tion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry pro-
vides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise
scope of the injury it seeks to remedy."' 3 3 Showing there is a statisti-
cal disparity between the pe:rcentage of a racial group in the popula-
tion and its participation in a particular occupation or industry is not
probative of whether there has been discrimination unless no other,
nondiscriminatory factors can explain the disparity.'34 There must
be a "strong basis in evidence" of past discrimination to prove the
need for remedial action.' 35 The finding of past discrimination must
be specific to the area within which the remedy is to be applied,1
3 6
and the finding must be specific to the particular racial groups that
stand to benefit. 137 The majority's discussion in City of Richmond
appears to supportJustice Stevens' conclusion that "[u]nless the leg-
islature can identify both the particular victims and the particular
perpetrators of past discrimination, which is precisely what a court
does when it makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, a remedial
justification for race-based legislation will almost certainly sweep too
broadly."'
' 38
If, alternatively, one adopts Justice Stevens' previously
expressed view that a racial classification may be used to serve a
legitimate public purpose without being remedial, then the "nar-
rowly tailored" requirement demands only that the legitimate pur-
pose cannot be achieved without a racial classification and "that
public interest, and the mariner in which it is pursued, justifies any
133 City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 723; cf. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) ("This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is
sufficient to justify a racial classification.").
134 See City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 725 ("Reliance on the disparity between the
number of prime contracts awarded to minority firms and the minority population of
the city of Richmond is ... misplaced.").
135 See id. at 724 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
136 See id. at 726-27 (noting that the finding of discrimination on a national scale
would not support finding discrimination in Richmond).
137 See id. at 727-28 ("The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical
matter, may never have suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in
Richmond, suggests that perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past
discrimination.").
138 Id. at 730 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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adverse effects on the disadvantaged [that is, the majority]
group."1 3 9
Under the remedial justification theory, which appears now to
be the majority view, the tax certificate program would fail the "nar-
rowly tailored" standard. The Commission did not even attempt to
present evidence that it, or anyone else, had specifically discrimi-
nated against racial minorities in licensing or sales of broadcast
properties. 140 Its finding that minorities own a smaller percentage of
stations than their percentage in the population1 4 1 would be insuffi-
cient just as the smaller percentage of minority-owned construction
companies was insufficient in City of Richmond. 4 2 And its lumping
together of "American Indians or Alaskan Natives, Asians and Pacific
Islanders, Blacks and Hispanics"' 14 3 as one class to receive an identi-
cal benefit would be taken as an indication that the purpose of the
program is not remedial or that the remedy is not narrowly tailored
to match the constitutional wrong.
In his opinion in Shurberg Broadcasting, Judge Silberman pointed
to several specific ways in which the distress sale program is not nar-
rowly tailored to remedy the putative wrong. The amount of benefit
to a minority-purchasers is a function of factors that are determined
by the market and are not tied to the degree of disadvantage that is
to be redressed. There is no requirement that beneficiaries of the
program show they are in fact disadvantaged and in need of a gov-
ernment benefit.144 Nor has the FCC shown that it cannot achieve
increased diversity with racially-neutral programs and that a race-
based remedy is essential. 145 He also concludes that the distress sale
policy is not narrowly tailored to the goal of programming diversity
because it was not shown that minority ownership would lead to
139 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
140 Language in a 1982 Congressional report suggests that the small number of
minority-owned stations is attributable to general societal discrimination rather than
any discrimination specific to the broadcasting industry. See H.R. CONF. REP. No.
765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1982) ("[T]he effects of past ineqities stemming from
racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe underrepresentation of
minorities in the media of mass communications, as it has adversely affected their
participation in other sectors of the economy as well.").
The court in Shurberg Broadcasting, 876 F.2d at 914-15, concluded this language
was not evidence of past discrimination that could support the racial classification of
the distress sale policy.
141 See supra text accompanying note 116.
142 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
143 See supra text accompanying note 63.
144 See Shurberg Broadcasting, 876 F.2d at 916. These objections are discussed in
more detail infra at notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
145 See Shurberg Broadcasting, 876 F.2d at 917.
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more diverse programming. Assuming that minority owners would
program differently than non-minority owners, he suggested, is an
impermissible form of racial stereotyping.' 46 All these objections
are equally applicable to the tax certificate program, supporting the
conclusion that it is not narrowly tailored.
The program, however, probably would be found "narrowly tai-
lored" under Justice Stevens' legitimate public purpose test. The
Commission found .specifically that its previous measures had not
been effective in producing substantial gains in minority owner-
ship. 147 Because the principal avenue of entry into the broadcasting
industry today, at least in large cities, is the purchase of existing sta-
tions,' 48 the Commission could conclude that providing an incentive
for present owners to sell to minorities is essential to achievement of
its legitimate purpose. Justice Stevens was prepared to find that even
discriminatory layoffs of white teachers inJackson, Michigan, was not
an excessive adverse effect in light of the school board's purpose.
149
In comparison, the disappointment and speculative injury suffered
by a potential station purchaser who loses out to a minority person in
bidding on a specific propert-y because of the program seems a rather
minor adverse effect. Other adverse effects, such as the burden on
all taxpayers of the cost of the tax benefit, while not insignificant,
probably would not be fatal to the program under Justice Stevens'
analysis.
C. Federal Versus State Competence
One of the most puzzling aspects of the affirmative action deci-
sions is the seeming inconsistency of approach between Fullilove,
upholding a federal affirmative action statute, and City of Richmond,
Wygant, and Bakke, which all struck down state or local affirmative
action programs. ChiefJustice Burger purported to apply a form of
146 See id. at 921-23.
147 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
148 Sales of existing stations are much more frequent than issuance of new
licenses. For example, from 1978 to 1987, the Commission approved 7,521
assignments and transfers of radio stations, and 616 such transactions involving
commercial television stations. See BROADCASTING, Feb. 8, 1988, at 62. This means
that on the average, two out of every three commercial radio stations and six out of
every ten commercial television stations changed hands during the ten-year period.
See BROADCASTING, Oct. 17, 1988, at 10 (showing 9,031 commercial radio stations
and 1,049 commercial television stations operating as of that date).
149 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 315-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a complete
discussion, see supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
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strict scrutiny in Fullilove, 5o but in fact he showed great deference to
Congress,15 1 and bent over backwards to find something that could
pass as "evidence" on which Congress could base "findings" that
there had been industry-wide discrimination in the construction
industry that required remediation. 152 The approach resembles the
minimal "rational basis" review afforded to classifications of eco-
nomic or social regulation measures not involving race. 153 In City of
Richmond, the Court worked to distinguish Fullilove and limit its hold-
ing to acts of Congress. The Court grudgingly acknowledged Fulli-
love as precedent, but showed no enthusiasm for it. Justice Kennedy
was most reluctant, implying that he might reexamine Fullilove's
holding if the issue were to be presented again.15 4 But in the pro-
cess of distinguishing, the Court appears to recognize a significant
difference between federal and state government racial classifications
or, perhaps, between congressionally created classifications and
those created by any other entity. Federal or congressional classifi-
cations appear to get much less rigid scrutiny.
155
150 "A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial
context, calls for close examination." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472. However, the Chief
Justice assiduously avoided using the words "strict scrutiny."
151 Id. at 483 ("It is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or
federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the
Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution [in section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment] with competence and authority to enforce equal protection
guarantees.").
152 Id. at 477-78 ("Congress had abundant evidence from which it could
conclude that minority businesses have been denied effective participation in public
contracting opportunities ... that perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination."
(emphasis added)).
This contention is disputed by Justice Stevens, who pointed out there was no
legislative history of the 10% minority set-aside in the public works bill and that the
"abundant evidence" consisted of 3 paragraphs in a House Report that had been
issued in connection with an entirely unrelated bill. He found Congress' entire
decisionmaking process on the MBE provision insufficient to support a claim that it
was necessary remedial legislation. See id. at 548-52 & n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153 See, e.g., Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (finding "a correlation between the classification and... a legitimate
purpose that we may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial legislature"
is sufficient to sustain inequality in allocation of retirement benefits); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory discrimination will not be set aside
if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.").
154 See City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 734 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in
the judgment) ("The process by which a law that is an equal protection violation
when enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal protection guarantee
when enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition for me; but as it is not before
us, any reconsideration of that issue must await some further case.").
155 See id. at 717-19. Justice O'Connor wrote:
"Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
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Applying these principles to the tax certificate program, it is
obvious the program is not a remedial measure enacted pursuant to
Congress' supposed special competence under section five of the
fourteenth amendment. Instead, it is a program devised by an
administrative agency charged with regulation of the communication
industries.' 5 6 The FCC arguably has no mandate or special compe-
tence to make findings that there has been racial discrimination that
needs a remedy. As described above, the Commission did not even
purport to make such a finding, nor has Congress, despite its appar-
ent support for the program.'
5 7
The constitutionality of the tax certificate program therefore is
doubtful under the Court's current approach in affirmative action
cases.' 5 8 But at the same time, it is unlikely that any aggrieved party
would succeed in overturning the program. Since Congress has
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment." . . . The Civil War Amendments themselves worked a
dramatic change in the balance between congressional and state power
over matters of race .... They were intended to be, what they really are,
limitations of the powers of the States and enlargements of the power of
Congress."
Id. at 719 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) and Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880) respectively).
Justice Scalia, who takes perhaps the narrowest view concerning justification for
racial classifications, agreed that Congress has more power in this area than states.
Id. at 736-37. He added: "The struggle for racial justice has historically been a
struggle by the national society against oppression in the individual States." Id. at
736.
156 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
158 On a related issue, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has held that affording comparative merit to minority ownership where the minority
owners are integrated in station management does not violate equal protection. See
West Mich. Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601, 613-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985). The Commission itself has expressed its opinion that
the minority preference Congress enacted for use in connection with licensing
lotteries would also be constitutional under Bakke and Fullilove. See Amendment of
the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from Among Certain Competing
Applications Using Random Selection or Lotteries Instead of Comparative Hearings,
93 F.C.C.2d 952, 974 (1983). Both authorities rely on the broad remedial authority
of Congress announced in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490, and the idea that only a plus
factor is being applied in a licensing procedure that also uses other valid factors
(comparative criteria or random selection) like the "Harvard plan" race-conscious
admissions process that was approved in dicta by Justice Powell in Bakke. See 438 U.S.
at 316-19.
However, the tax certificate program is distinguishable in two important ways: it
has not been enacted by Congress in a process that involved "findings" of past
discrimination and a determination of an appropriate remedy, and it uses race as the
sole basis on which to grant or deny a tax benefit.
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twice indicated its support for measures to encourage minority own-
ership,'59 it seems likely that any adverse court decision would
induce Congress to pass legislation specifically finding that past
racial discrimination has resulted in underrepresentation of minori-
ties in broadcasting, and declaring that the program serves a compel-
ling governmental interest in eliminating the effects of that
discrimination (as well as serving the first amendment diversity inter-
est). 6 ° The Commission would thus be authorized to continue the
program. Congress or the Commission itself could also make
changes to fit the program more exactly to the identified governmen-
tal interests. In short, while the program does not appear to be cov-
ered by Fullilove as currently adopted, Congress could easily take
action to bring it squarely under the Fullilove umbrella, putting its
constitutionality beyond question, at least as long as Fullilove remains
the law.
159 Congress expressed its wishes in the 1982 enactment requiring racial
preference in licensing lotteries, see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text, and in
the 1987 supplemental appropriation rider (without legislative history) forbidding
the Commission from changing its racial preference programs. See supra notes 99-
100 and accompanying text.
160 For an example of how Congress has covered the constitutional concerns
about a racial classification program by creating appropriate language in the
legislative history, see H. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2261, 2287-88, which was written to support
the minority-applicant preference requirement in the license lottery provision of the
Communications Amendments Act of 1982. The report states:
The Conferees find that the effects of past inequities stemming from racial
and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe underrepresentation
of minorities in the media of mass communications .... We note that the
National Association of Broadcasters recently reported that of 8,748
commercial broadcast stations in existence in December, 1981, only 164,
or less than two percent, were minority owned. Similarly, only 32 of the
1,386 noncommercial stations, slightly over two percent, were minority
owned.
One means of remedying the past economic disadvantage to
minorities which has limited their entry into . . . the media of mass
communications, while promoting the primary communications policy
objective of achieving a greater diversification of the media of mass
communications, is to provide that a significant preference be awarded to
minority-controlled applicants in FCC licensing proceedings, for the
media of mass communications. The narrowly-drawn preference scheme
established in section 309(i), as it is amended by this legislation, is
intended to achieve such a purpose.
Id This language, while it might be discarded as conclusory dicta if invoked by a city
council, is certainly as much as or more than the evidence the former Chief Justice
found "abundant" in upholding the minority set-aside statute in Fullilove.
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IV. TAX POLICY
The FCC tax certificate program encourages sales of broadcast
stations to minority-controlled businesses because it provides sellers
an opportunity to defer payment of tax on capital gain income which
otherwise would be recognized in the year in which the transaction
occurs. The availability of this valuable tax-saving benefit gives the
seller an incentive to choose a minority buyer over a non-minority
buyer who is offering the same price. The seller may also be willing
to sell to a minority person at a lower price than she would require
from a non-minority buyer, since the minority buyer pays in dollars
that are not subject to current tax. Both effects may occur together
in a given case. 6 ' Such a tax law provision, used to encourage a
desired behavior rather than just to measure income and raise reve-
nue, produces what has become known as a "tax expenditure."'
' 6 2
Examination of the program based on tax expenditure analysis
points to several reasons why the program should not remain part of
the income tax law.'
63
161 The Commission itself has recognized this analysis of the economic
operation of a tax certificate:
[A] tax certificate enables the seller to defer taxes on capital gains, and
thus provides an incentive to transfer a broadcast station to a minority-
owned or controlled entity. Moreover, a 'tax certificate effectively
subsidizes the bargaining position of minority entrepreneurs seeking to
enter the telecommunications marketplace' because a 'tax certificate is
effective only in those situations where the seller's capital gains savings
exceeds the difference in purchase price offered by a non-minority and a
minority purchaser.'
1982 Policy Statement, supra note 54, at 855 (quoting THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE FINANCING FOR MINORITY OPPORTUNITIES IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 8-9 (May 1982)).
162 "Tax expenditures" are statutorily defined as "revenue losses attributable to
provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of
tax, or a deferral of tax liability .... Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C.
§ 622(3) (1982).
163 For a general discussion of the tax expenditure concept and the
disadvantages of tax expenditures from a policy standpoint, see S. SURREY & P.
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 1-30 (1985).
Although the basics of tax expenditure analysis have become widely accepted,
political reasons have deterred Congress from removing tax expenditures from the
tax code. See Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology (Book Review), 99
HARV. L. REV. 491, 497-98 (1985).
FCC TAX CERTIFICATES
A. Objections to the Program as a Tax Expenditure
1. Inefficiency
The program theoretically gives minority-controlled businesses
the chance to obtain a "discount" in the purchase of broadcasting
property. The discount might be any amount that does not exceed
the seller's estimation of the net present value of the tax deferral
benefit. However, there is a real incentive to participate only if the
seller is better off with a tax certificate than without it, and that
occurs only if the seller retains some portion of the tax savings for
herself, passing only part of it along to the minority buyer in the
form of a reduced price. The seller might retain the entire financial
benefit if there are competing buyers.
When a certificate is issued, a minority person has acquired a
station, but the non-minority seller has received a financial reward.
Thus the program is to some extent "inefficient" because only some
of the benefit dispensed by the government finds its way to the
intended beneficiaries-that is, minority buyers.'
64
2. Inability to Control Amount of the Benefit
Another consequence of the indirect provision of the benefit
through the seller-intermediary is that there is no rational relation-
ship between the amount of benefit provided in a given case and the
amount that would actually be needed to achieve the desired
result.' 6 5 The amount that the government "spends"' 6 6 on each tax
certificate, which is the amount of tax revenue that is indefinitely
delayed, is measured by the amount of unrealized appreciation of the
broadcast property that has occurred in the hands of the seller multi-
plied by the seller's income tax rate. The amount of benefit that is
required for effectiveness is the smallest sum that would be sufficient
to induce the seller to seek or select a minority buyerplus the small-
164 See S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, supra note 163, at 83 ("[Some] tax
expenditures are inefficient because they provide tax savings to middlemen who
deliver the government assistance to the targeted beneficiaries. All such middlemen
obtain a commission for their role.").
165 See id. at 82-83 ("Some tax expenditures simply pay individuals for
continuing to engage in their activities .... Other tax expenditures are inefficient
because the tax savings (subsidies) greatly exceed the value of the activity induced.").
166 The key insight of tax expenditure analysis is that "departures from the
normal tax structure. . . designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class of
persons," are functionally equivalent to direct government spending programs, even
if they are implemented as an exclusion of income from tax, a deduction, or a
deferral of tax liability. See id. at 3.
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est amount (if any) that the minority buyer requires in reduction
from market price to enable (and induce) her to complete the trans-
action. The value of the tax certificate may be much more or much
less than the amount required for effectiveness. If it is less, the buyer
will probably not get the station and the program will be ineffective.
If the tax certificate value is more than the amount required for effec-
tiveness, a transaction probably will occur, but the program will be
inefficient because its cost to the government exceeds the amount
necessary to accomplish the desired result. 6 7 The program can be
effective and efficient only in the fortuitous and unlikely event that
the value of the tax certificate to the seller is exactly equal to the
amount of assistance needed to produce the desired transaction.
3. Inability to Control Total Program Cost
Like the amount of assistance dispensed in each particular case,
the total amount spent under the program is also uncontrolled.
Although the Commission set up the tax certificate program and
established objective criteria for its operation, the Commission can-
not control how many transactions will take place or what the pro-
gram ultimately will cost.
The cost of the program is reflected in actual reduction of
income tax receipts, which must be made up either by increasing the
burden on other taxpayers, or by an equal increase in the federal
budget deficit. The effect is indistinguishable from any direct gov-
ernment spending program. But the cost has no direct effect on the
FCC budget or the amount of money the agency has to spend on its
other programs. The amount to be spent need not be appropriated
by Congress.' 68 Until this year, even the tax expenditure budgets
prepared for Congress did not account for the program.' 6 9 The tax
167 It appears that officials at the FCC who review tax certificate requests could
not consider the appropriateness of the dollar value of the assistance requested even
if they were so inclined. This is because none of the documents required to be filed
in connection with a request for consent to transfer a broadcast l.ense provide any
information about the amount of gain or loss the seller is realizing in the transaction.
Nor do letters to the Commission requesting tax certificates provide such
information.
168 See S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, supra note 163, at 32-54 (explaining how most
tax expenditure items are listed in the executive and congressional budget
documents, but control of the programs is not integrated into the regular budget
decision process); Simon, The Budget Process and the Tax Law, 40 TAX NOTES 627, 628-
35 (1988) (pointing out that Congress does not coordinate tax writing and spending
decisions because different commtttees have jurisdiction and because the executive
branch has little control over Congress).
169 Fiscal year 1990 appears to be the first year in which FCC tax certificates
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expenditure budget prepared by the executive still does not include
it. 17° Even more than for other tax expenditure programs, the true
cost of the tax certificate program is hidden from government deci-
sion makers and the public. Thus, it is hard to see how officials
administering it have any incentive to keep the cost under reasonable
control, even if they had the means of doing so. Nor is there any
balancing of the social value of the program against all the other pro-
grams, both of the FCC and of all other agencies and departments,
that compete for a slice of the federal budget.'1
7
B. Possible Responses to Tax Policy Concerns
This analysis shows that the program's shortcomings are similar
to other "tax expenditure" provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.'72 Thus, some of the standard suggestions for improving tax
expenditure programs in other areas may be appropriate here as
well.
One such suggestion-that administrative responsibility be
shared between the Internal Revenue Service and the administrative
agency otherwise responsible for programs dealing with the same
subject 73 -has been used in this program since its inception. The
FCC, which is the government agency with primary responsibility for
protecting and advancing the public interest in broadcasting, deter-
mines eligibility for the tax benefit and processes applications for tax
certificates. Then the IRS determines whether the seller meets the
requirement of reinvesting in other property that is "similar or
related in service or use" within the specified period, 174 and ensures
have appeared on the congressional tax expenditure list. Compare STAFF OF THEJOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 24, at 15 (fiscal year 1990 estimates, listing a revenue
loss from FCC tax certificates) with STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH
CONG., 2D SESS., ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1989-1993,
(Joint Comm. Print 1988) (fiscal year 1989 estimates, not listing FCC tax certificates).
170 See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GoV'T FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1990, Special Analysis G, table G-1 (1989) (tax expenditure budget, not
including FCC tax certificates).
171 See S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, supra note 163, at 32-33 ("[Ekvery tax
expenditure automatically has a higher budget priority than any direct spending
program" because tax expenditures are not subject to the annual budget process.
(emphasis in original)).
. 172 See id. at 31-98 (discussing problems in tax policy and.budget policy which
are raised by tax expenditures).
173 See id. at 111-12 (describing requirement of certification from the Interior
Department before IRS will allow a tax credit for historic building rehabilitation).
174 See 26 U.S.C. § 1033(a)(1) (1986).
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that the deferred tax ultimately is collected if and when the replace-
ment property is disposed of by the seller.'
7 5
However, the problems of ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and lack
of fiscal control that were described above have not been addressed.
Tax expenditure analysis suggests that tax expenditures, when feasi-
ble, should be replaced with direct government spending pro-
grams.' 76 Instead of issuing tax certificates to sellers, the FCC could
use other methods of assisting qualified minority entrepreneurs to
enter the broadcasting industry. This assistance could take several
forms: outright grants; contribution to a venture capital fund which
would become a partner or investor in minority-controlled busi-
nesses; or provision of below-market-rate loans, or loan guarantees,
for purchase of stations and for working capital.
Except for administrative expense, such programs would be
highly efficient, because all of the benefits provided would go to
minority broadcasters. Even administrative expenses might not be
increased, because FCC staff already must process and examine tax
certificate requests. Properly designed, a direct program would pro-
vide only the level of assistance for which a minority buyer showed
need after exhausting all other available sources of capital. Such a
program could prove more effective than the current system because
minority buyers would bid for those stations which seemed most
appropriate for their business plans, rather than those for which the
sellers felt a special need to get a tax benefit. Finally, a direct pro-
gram would be brought under the government's normal budgeting
process, in which it would have to compete for funds with all other
government programs, and there would be an actual decision each
year about how much money the program should receive.
The tax certificate program is therefore a tax expenditure item
that could be transformed into a direct spending program, with
potential gains in efficiency, effectiveness, and fiscal accountability.
V. PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION
Assuming that the tax certificate program is lawful and constitu-
tional, and that it should continue to be operated through the tax
175 For a complete discussion of IRS handling of FCC tax certificates, see
generally Blake & McKenna, supra note 42.
176 See S. SURREY & P. McDANIEL, supra note 163, at 98; see also Simon, supra note
168, at 634-37 (arguing that the tax system would benefit from elimination of all tax
expenditures; short of that, tax expenditures and direct outlays should be
determined at the same time by one executive agency and one committee in each
house of Congress).
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system rather than as a direct spending program, there remain ques-
tions about whether it is well designed to achieve its intended pur-
pose effectively, efficiently, and without abuse. It could be improved
in a number of ways. The following program weaknesses are readily
apparent: (1) there is no assurance that the minority control of
broadcasting that the Commission has purchased with lost tax reve-
nue will be permanent, or even will continue for a substantial period
of time; (2) there is no way to avoid giving far more tax benefit than
is needed, in some cases, to achieve the desired result; (3) tax certifi-
cates are probably granted in circumstances in which minority own-
ership would have occurred without giving up tax revenue; and (4)
there is no assurance that the program's goal-increase in viewpoint
diversity and programming diversity-will be realized. Some of
these weaknesses inhere in the existing program because the applica-
tion procedure does not provide Commission staff with sufficient
information to make better informed decisions.
A. The Information Gap
A request for a tax certificate is made to the Commission's Sec-
retary by letter. It usually is made simultaneously with submission of
an application for either "Consent to Assignment" of license, or
"Consent to Transfer Control."' 77 Sonietimes the request is made
while the assignment/transfer application is under consideration, or
even after consent to assignment or transfer is given. The request
needs to establish only two facts: (1) that the Commission has con-
sented to assignment or transfer, or that an approvable application
has been made; and (2) that the assignee or transferee is a member
of one of the specified minority groups, or is minority-controlled.
No showing is required that diversity of ownership or diversity of
programming viewpoints will increase as a result of the assignment
or transfer.17 Upon a showing that minority control exists, the
177 See FCC Form 732, Mar. 1983.
178 Successful applications for tax certificates generally need only establish that
the transferee will be minority-controlled. There is usually no discussion of
diversification or programming issues. See, e.g., Letter from LindaJ. Eckard (counsel
for sellers of WPZZ(FM), Franklin, Ind.) to FCC Acting Secretary H. Walker Feaster,
III (Mar. 11, 1988) (available in FCC license file of WPZZ(FM)) ("The proposed
assignee corporation will be wholly-owned by Bishop L. E. Willis, who is a minority
person. Therefore, the assignor requests that the FCC issue a tax certificate.., since
a grant would further the FCC's minority ownership policies."); Petition for Issuance
of Tax Certificate [for sale of KITV(TV), Honolulu, Hawaii] (filed Nov. 13, 1986)
(available in FCC license file of KITV(TV)) ("All of the outstanding stock of Assignee
corporation Tak Communications, Inc. is owned by Sharad Tak, a naturalized U.S.
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Commission apparently presumes that diversity of viewpoints and
ownership will result.
The assignment application' 79 provides most of the information
upon which the Commission staff bases its decision on the request.
It provides complete information on ownership of the proposed
assignee, its legal business structure, other existing media interests
of the owners, and the terms on which the assignee is acquiring the
assets. However, it provides no racial or ethnic information.' 80 The
racial or ethnic identification of the assignee is generally alleged in
the request letter or in a brief supporting document, but generally
there is no material documenting or supporting the claim.'
8
1
The Commission also lacks other key items of information. It
does not know how much gain the seller/assignor will realize on the
transaction. It has no direct information on the financial capacity of
the minority assignee, its ability to obtain credit, or its ability to
purchase the station without government assistance. It does not
know whether the minority buyer intends to retain and operate the
station indefinitely, or contemplates reselling it. Nor does it know
who will manage the station after the assignment. All of these infor-
mation deficiencies are obstacles to optimal administration of the
program.
B. Permanent Minority Control
When the Commission delays collection of thousands, or even
millions, of dollars of tax revenue to facilitate the sale of a station to
minority-group owners, it should have some assurance that minority
citizen and a Subcontinent Asian Indian. Pursuant to the Commission's rules and
policies, Asians clearly qualify as minorities .... Of even more particular relevance
... the Commission issued a tax certificate to Liberty Broadcasting, Inc., which sold
four television stations to ... a company 100 percent owned by Sharad Tak.... For
the foregoing reasons, the sale of sLations KITV, KMAU and KHVO is necessary and
appropriate to effectuate compliance with the Commission's policies regarding
minority ownership of broadcast facilities, and thus the issuance of a tax certificate is
warranted.").
179 See FCC Form 314, Mar. 1983.
180 See id.
181 See id. However, assignees sometimes submit statements affirming their
minority status. See, e.g., Declaration of Gisela B. Huberman (controlling shareholder
of proposed assignee of WLVW(FM), Salisbury, Md.) (May 29, 1986) (available in
FCC license file of WLVW(FM)) ("I consider myself to be an Hispanic minority. I
was born in Mexico and both of my parents were and are Mexican nationals. I
retained my Mexican citizenship until becoming a naturalized United States citizen
on January 9, 1968, Certificate No. 9037775. My native language is Spanish, and I
have consistently identified myself as an Hispanic.").
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ownership will last. Currently, there is an opportunity for abusive
but profitable transactions, in which, for example, a licensee sells to a
minority buyer for a below-market price, but still earns a profit
because of a tax deferral. The minority-controlled buyer then re-
sells a year or two later to a non-minority person at something closer
to market price, turning a quick profit. The result is great cost to the
government, economic benefit to both the recipient and a minority
entrepreneur, but no increase in permanent minority ownership.
The Commission apparently recognized this abuse opportunity, and
announced that minority buyers under tax certificates may not re-sell
for one year unless it is to another minority buyer.'8 2 However, this
does not provide sufficient protection for the integrity of the minor-
ity-ownership policy. A good example of the problem is the 1987
grant of a tax certificate-to Gaylord Broadcasting Company on the
sale of television station WTVT in Tampa, Florida.' 83 A shareholder
agreement, which was provided to the Commission, gave the non-
minority-group shareholder an irrevocable option to buy out the
minority-group shareholder (who was otherwise in legal control)
18 4
on very favorable terms any time during the third, fourth, and fifth
years following commencement of the business.' 8 5 This arrange-
182 The one-year holding rule was re-imposed on persons who acquired stations
under any of the racial preference programs, in order to avoid defeating the purpose
of those programs. This action came after the Commission had abolished its
previous "anti-trafficking' ' rule, which generally barred assignment of a license until
it has been held for three years. The one-year rule currently also applies to a person
who has received a license in a comparative hearing. See Amendment of Section
73.3597 of the Commission's Rules, 99 F.C.C.2d 971, 971-72 (1985); 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3597 (1987).
183 See Tax Certificate, supra note 59.
184 Clarence McKee, a black, owns 210 shares of "class A" stock, which carries
four votes each. Gillet Group, a non-minority entity, owns 790 shares of "class B"
stock, which carries one vote each. Thus, McKee controls 51.53% of the votes and is
legally in control of the licensee, WTVT Holdings, Inc. See Request for Issuance of
Tax Certificate, filed by Gaylord Broadcasting Co. (Mar. 20, 1987) (available in FCC
license file of WTVT(TV)).
185 See WTVT Shareholder Agreement, supra note 59, at 7, 10. Under the
agreement, neither shareholder may dispose of its interest without the consent of the
other. Id. at 2. Also, each has a right of first refusal in the event the other wants to
sell any shares. Id. at 2-3.
If Gillett exercises the option, McKee will receive one million dollars or a
fraction of the company's then net worth (based on his proportion of stock
ownership), whichever is more. Id. at 10. The station was purchased for $365
million in 1987. See Asset Purchase Agreement between WTVT Holdings, Inc. and
Gaylord Broadcasting Co., at 5 (Mar. 5, 1987) (available in FCC license file of
WTVT(TV)). WTVT Holdings, Inc. was capitalized at only $1,000, and the purchase
was entirely financed with borrowed money. See Articles of Incorporation of WTVT
Holdings, Inc. (Mar. 4, 1987); WTVT Shareholder Agreement, supra, note 59, at I
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ment not only fails to provide a reasonable assurance of permanent
minority control, but it creates a strong suspicion that minority con-
trol is intended to be temporary. The grant of this tax certificate has
been strongly criticized. 1 86 Even though there are unofficial indica-
tions that the Commission would not approve such an arrangement
today,' 8 7 the Commission has not published any statement on the
matter,18 8 thus creating confusion about its actual policy position.
The Commission should establish a policy that it will not
approve a transfer of control or assignment of a tax certificate prop-
erty to a non-minority-controlled entity for a substantial period of
time-say five years-unless the licensee proves that it is incapable of
continuing operation, and that it has made a good faith effort to find
a new minority-controlled buyer. In addition, the Commission
should refuse to issue a tax certificate if, as in the WTVT case, the
transaction documents create any reason to doubt that the license
will remain under minority control for an indefinite period. The
administration of the program should remain true to its goal, which
is to encourage increased viewpoint-diversity through permanent
minority control of broadcast facilities.
C. Limiting the Amount of Tax Deferred
Because a tax certificate allows deferral of capital gains tax by
the seller, the larger the amount of gain to be realized in a sale, the
more incentive there is to find a minority buyer. It is therefore likely
that in many cases the benefit the seller receives from the tax certifi-
cate exceeds the amount of subsidy needed to bring about minority
("[T]he Glass B Shareholder has agreed to arrange financing for the Purchase upon
the condition that the Class A Shareholder enter into this Agreement ... ").
186 See Vise, Minority Broadcasters' Tax Break Hit, Wash. Post, Jul. 12, 1987, at H1,
H6, col. 1. "Facades like that can damage the purpose of policies that give minorities
the chance to participate in broadcasting. That is nothing but a sham. It appears to
be a front operation." Id. (quoting Rep. Mickey Leland (D-Tex.)); "[D]eals like
WTVT drive out bona fide purchasers. We do feel strongly this process should not
be abused." Id. (quoting communications lawyer Charlie Firestone).
187 See Richter, Entrepreneur Builds Broadcast Empire on Debt, L. A. Times, Dec. 27,
1987, § 4, at 1, 4, col. 2 ("While FCC officials insist that the Tampa deal was proper,
the notoriety of the transaction seems to be changing regulators' attitudes. Already,
FCC staff members have discouraged several minority tax certificate proposals that
were floated by them for preliminary review, according to an investment banker with
firsthand knowledge of the proposals. 'The legacy of that deal is that it is going to be
much tougher for others,' the banker said.").
188 The Gaylord Broadcasting certificate, like all others since 1980, was
approved by the Commission staff without any published opinion or other
explanation of the decision.
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control of the station. In the WTVT case, it appears that Gaylord
will be able to defer more than one hundred million dollars in tax
liability.18 9 It is reported that the New York Times Company
received a tax benefit of fifty-five million dollars under a tax certifi-
cate issued for the $420 million sale of its southern NewJersey cable
television operations.1 90 A radio group owner who has purchased a
number of stations under the program said that he generally can buy
for about twenty percent less than ordinary market value,' 9 ' indicat-
ing that his vendors realized tax savings of more than twenty percent
of the sale price. Forsaking such large amounts of tax revenue to
achieve minority ownership of a single television station or other
facility is wasteful and excessive.
A limit should be placed on the amount of capital gains tax that
can be deferred under the program. Section 1071192 should be
amended to provide that when the FCC certifies a transaction, the
gain realized may receive involuntary conversion treatment up to a
limit of thirty percent of the sale price of the property. At the cur-
rent maximum corporate tax rate of thirty-four percent,1 93 and the
top individual rate of twenty-eight percent, 94 such an amendment
would permit deferral of tax liability up to approximately ten percent
of the sale price. This should compensate for any reasonable extra
transaction costs that would be involved in arranging a sale to a
minority buyer, and still provide an incentive for the desired behav-
ior without overcompensating. Using a percentage of sale price limi-
tation is preferable to a flat dollar limitation because the percentage
approach will provide effective incentive for minority ownership of
large as well as small stations. This approach will not provide an
exact match between the amount of government assistance provided
189 In a financing memo circulated by the investment banking firm Drexel,
Burnham, Lambert, Inc., Gillett says that "[t]he $365 million purchase price for
WTVT is approximately $135 million below [Gillett's] estimate of its market value."
Vise, supra note 186, at H6, col. 1. "Gaylord had owned the Tampa station for 30
years, purchasing it in 1956 for about $4 million. With its investment in the station
quite low, Gaylord's potential tax liability from the sale could have exceeded $100
million, Wall Street sources said. Gaylord officials declined to comment about the
minority tax certificate .... Id. See also Vaughan, Television Tycoon: George Gillett, Jr.,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1988, § 3, at 9, col. 1 (estimating that the tax certificate allowed
deferral of $110 million in tax).
190 See Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 1 (announcing deal).
191 See Gnoffo, He Has an Earfor Radio Stations, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 17, 1989,
at 13G (explaining how Philadelphia lawyer Ragan Henry used the program to build
the largest radio station chain in the country).
192 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
193 See 26 U.S.C. § 11 (Supp. V 1987).
194 See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1987).
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and the amount needed to achieve the desired result. Alternatively,
the Commission could require a minority buyer to justify a particular
amount of tax deferral requested by her vendor and show that it is
necessary to the transaction. However, such a rule would require
very subjective evaluations of the situation of each prospective seller
and each prospective minority buyer, and could be quite difficult for
the Commission to perform fairly and accurately. Either plan would
be an improvement over the current open-ended program, which has
no limits on how much the government "spends."
D. Group Owners and Station Management
The tax certificate program is justified in the name of increasing
viewpoint-diversity through minority ownership of broadcasting.
This justification raises two questions: (1) should eligibility for a tax
certificate depend on how many media interests the minority-group
buyer already owns, and (2) should it be relevant whether minority-
group persons will manage the station after the assignment or trans-
fer? The current program treats both of these factors as irrelevant.
This rule is unjustifiable in light of the overall policy goal of increas-
ing diversity.
Suppose a profitable radio station that has been independently
owned by a local owner-manager is sold under the program to a
minority-controlled concern, headquartered in another state, that
owns other broadcast properties. The new owner retains the staff,
appoints a manager who is not a minority person, and instructs the
manager to make no changes in the operation and to continue the
existing programming format. There is now one less owner of radio
stations than before the transaction. The station involved is now
under absentee rather than local ownership, and the service pro-
vided by the station is essentially the same as before. It is difficult to
justify a presumption that diversity of ownership or viewpoints has
been increased. In fact, diversity of ownership has been reduced,
and programming viewpoint has not been changed, while the new
hired manager of the station might be less sensitive to local condi-
tions and needs than the former owner. An example of such an
owner is Philadelphia lawyer Ragan Henry, who reportedly
purchased twenty-eight radio stations across the country in a span of
twenty months using tax certificates. He denies having a "Black"
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programming viewpoint; instead he programs whatever he thinks
will make the most money in each market.' 95
In the context of comparative hearings, the Commission has
long favored applicants who have less existing media interests over
those with more, and applicants who propose to have ownership
"integrated" in management over those who do not. The same crite-
ria could also be used to decide whether to grant a tax benefit for a
particular transaction, or (if the statute were changed) how much
benefit to allow. For example, if the buyer is already well established
in the broadcasting industry, and owns a number of stations, it is
reasonable to assume that the buyer (even if minority) does not need
government assistance to acquire additional stations. Sharad Tak is
a case in point. In a span of five years, Mr. Tak, who qualifies as a
minority person because he is a naturalized native of India (Asian-
American), purchased all or controlling shares of six television sta-
tions with the aid of tax certificates. One has since been re-sold.' 96
It is recognized that Mr. Tak is now a rich and powerful man.'
97
While there is nothing wrong with wealth, there is no reason why an
195 See Gnoffo, supra note 191.
196 The Commission approved assignment of KTBY(TV), Anchorage, Alaska,
from Totem Broadcasting Corporation to KTBY, Inc. (controlled by Mr. Tak) on July
11, 1984, and a tax certificate was issued. Five months later, on December 21, 1984,
Mr. Tak sought permission to transfer control of KTBY, Inc. to Ronald Bradley, the
General Manager of the station. The Commission gave consent on December 31,
1984. See FCC Form 732 Consent to Assignment (Jul. 11, 1984) (available in FCC
license file of KTBY(TV)); FCC Form 314 (May 23, 1984) (available in FCC license
file of KTBY(TV)); Minority Ownership Lists, supra note 18; Letter from Kevin F.
Reed, counsel for KTBY, Inc. to FCC Secretary WilliamJ. Tricarico (Dec. 20, 1984)
(explaining proposed transfer of control to Mr. Bradley) (filed with Commission Dec.
21, 1984) (available in FCC license file of KTBY(TV)); BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING
YEARBOOK 1988, at C-i 14 (noting FCC approval of transfer to Bradley).
Mr. Tak currently owns WGRZ-TV, Buffalo, New York (agreement to purchase
for $100 million, subject to FCC approval, announced May 2, 1988). See BUSINESS
FIRST - BUFFALO, May 9, 1988, § 1, at 8. He owns KITV(TV), Honolulu, Hawaii (plus
two satellite stations) (approved Jan. 27, 1987). See BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING
YEARBOOK 1988, at C-21. Tak also owns four Wisconsin TV stations: WKOW-TV,
Madison, WXOW-TV, LaCrosse, WQOW-TV, Eau Claire, and WAOW-TV, Wausau,
(all approvedJan. 7, 1985, except WQOW-TV, approvedJan. 24, 1985). See id. at C-
140, C-141. Tax certificates were issued for each transaction. See Minority
Ownership Lists, supra note 18.
197 See Leslie, The Fourth Annual Regardie's 100: The Richest People in Washington,
REGARDIES THE BUSINESS OF WASH., Sept. 1988, § 1, at 85 (listing Mr. Tak as among
the 100 richest Washingtonians and describing his businesses). At the time he
purchased WGRZ-TV for $100 million, Mr. Tak was also controlling stockholder of
ST Systems Corporation, "one of the country's leading providers of software to the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration
and the Department of Defense." See N.Y. Times, May 4, 1988, at D20, col. 5.
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already well-established entrepreneur with considerable financial
resources and presumably ready access to the credit market should
continue to benefit from a program which was created because of
concern about the difficulties that minority persons have in breaking
into the broadcasting industry.
In the past, the question of who will manage a station after
assignment has been considered immaterial in determining whether
a seller is eligible for a tax certificate. This policy is misguided. A
tax certificate should not be granted unless there are assurances that
minority persons will actively be involved in the day-to-day manage-
ment of the station. Mr. Tak apparently is not involved in the daily
operation of any of his stations, since he lives in Maryland, and the
stations are all located in other states.' 98 The Commission already
requires minority-group owners to be "integrated" into daily man-
agement for them to receive enhancement credit in a comparative
licensing proceeding.' 99  The requirement is quite reasonable,
because it helps to justify the Commission's presumption of public
benefit through increased viewpoint diversity, a presumption which
underlies all of the Commission's minority preference programs.




Racial minorities historically have been poorly represented,
both in broadcast programming and in ownership of broadcast sta-
tions. The Commission's tax certificate program, which was devel-
oped out of policies favoring equal employment opportunity,
diversity of viewpoints in broadcast programming, and the desirabil-
198 See Leslie, supra note 196 (listing Mr. Tak as a resident of Potomac,
Maryland).
199 See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
200 I do not suggest that buyers in tax certificate cases be required to show how
they will increase viewpoint diversity in the market. That would require making
promises concerning future programming. The Commission wisely has abstained
from exercising control over the programming decisions of licensees. See
Formulation of Policy Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, 66 F.C.C.2d 419
(1977) (declining to adopt percenlage guidelines for local programming, news, and
public affairs on television stations), aff'd sub nom. National Black Media Coalition v.
FCC, 589 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Changes in the Entertainment Formats of
Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976) (abandoning efforts to preserve diversity
in radio formats by regulation and concluding that the public interest is best served
by allowing licensees the freedom to change formats in response to market forces),
rev'd sub nom. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd,
450 U.S. 593 (1981) (upholding Commission).
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ity of minority ownership of stations, has increased the number of
minority-owned stations over the past 10 years, although ownership
remains substantially below the percentage of minority groups in the
population.
The Commission launched this racial classification program
without any specific statutory authority, and without ever finding that
it was necessary to remedy past racial discrimination in the industry.
Only when an appellate court and the Commission itself questioned
the legality of the program did Congress intervene and give it's after-
the-fact approval. As currently established and justified, the pro-
gram probably could not pass the equal protection standards for
affirmative action programs as reflected in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in the City of Richmond case. The companion distress sale policy
has been held unconstitutional as applied by the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court has granted review in this case, and in another
case that raises the consitutionality of the companion comparative
merit preference policy. However, Congress probably has the power
to overcome any constitutional objections by making appropriate
findings and re-authorizing the program.
The current program is implemented as a "tax expenditure,"
which inevitably introduces inefficiencies, and impairs the ability of
the Commission to control the magnitude and operation of the pro-
gram. Conversion to a direct spending program would offer signifi-
cant advantages.
Even if the program is lawful and should continue to be oper-
ated through the income tax system, it suffers from administrative
weaknesses which make it vulnerable to abuses which compromise
the viewpoint-diversity rationale. These problems could be lessened
through more careful program design, which would also reduce the
risk that the program would be invalidated as not narrowly tailored
to achieve compelling governmental interests.
Despite the problems with the Commission's program, its objec-
tive is worthwhile. American society needs diverse broadcast pro-
gramming, which includes full and fair presentation of minority
viewpoints. Minority ownership probably contributes to this objec-
tive,21 though it is certainly not the only means by which the objec-
tive might be pursued.
201 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., MINORITY
BROADCAST STATION OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMMING: Is THERE A NEXUS (June 29,
1988), at cover page (indicating minority- and female-owned stations provide more
minority- and female-oriented programming than non-minority or -female owned
stations, respectively).
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Finally, the symbolic importance of Commission policies such as
equal employment opportunity and viewpoint-diversity can hardly be
overlooked in our diverse society. To quote former FCC Commis-
sioner Tyrone Brown:
[T]he FCC's commitment to minority participation always has had
a greater significance than is indicated by the current level of
minority ownership. That significance is illustrated by the com-
ments of a very successful minority programmer who has never
been a direct beneficiary of the agency's minority initiatives but is
convinced nonetheless that 'the very existence of the FCC's com-
mitment has opened doors in the private sector that otherwise
would have been closed to me.'
20 2
The Commission should retain and strengthen its twenty year com-
mitment to minority participation in the broadcasting industry. Crit-
icism of the current tax certificate program is no reason to retreat
from the policy. Instead, it points the way toward what can be done
to make the policy more effective and efficient.
202 Brown, The FCC's New Threat to Minority Preferences, Wash. Post, Sept. 26,
1986, at A-27, col. 4.
